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On the Continuous Equilibria of Affiliated-Value, All-Pay Auctions with Private Budget Constraints, Second Version

Author

Listed:
  • Maciej H. Kotowski

    () (John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University)

  • Fei Li

    () (Department of Economics, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill)

Abstract

We consider all-pay auctions in the presence of interdependent, affiliated valuations and private budget constraints. For the sealed-bid, all-pay auction we characterize a symmetric equilibrium in continuous strategies for the case of N bidders. Budget constraints encourage more aggressive bidding among participants with large endowments and intermediate valuations. We extend our results to the war of attrition where we show that budget constraints lead to a uniform amplification of equilibrium bids among bidders with sufficient endowments. An example shows that with both interdependent valuations and private budget constraints, a revenue ranking between the two auction formats is generally not possible. Equilibria with discontinuous bidding strategies are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Maciej H. Kotowski & Fei Li, 2012. "On the Continuous Equilibria of Affiliated-Value, All-Pay Auctions with Private Budget Constraints, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-043, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 05 Aug 2013.
  • Handle: RePEc:pen:papers:13-043
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian, 2006. "Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(1), pages 95-118, March.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    All-Pay Auction; War of Attrition; Budget Constraints; Common Values; Private Values; Affiliation; Contests;

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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