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Revenue Comparisons for Auctions When Bidders Have Arbitrary Types

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Oleksii Birulin & Sergei Izmalkov, 2022. "On advance payments in tenders with budget constrained contractors," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(4), pages 733-762, December.
  2. Baisa, Brian, 2017. "Auction design without quasilinear preferences," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(1), January.
  3. Li, Xinyu & Haan, Marco A. & Onderstal, Sander & Veldman, Jasper, 2025. "A wind tunnel test of wind farm auctions," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).
  4. Bobkova, Nina, 2020. "Asymmetric budget constraints in a first-price auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
  5. Malueg, David A. & Orzach, Ram, 2009. "Revenue comparison in common-value auctions: Two examples," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 177-180, November.
  6. Lu, Jingfeng & Parreiras, Sérgio O., 2017. "Monotone equilibrium of two-bidder all-pay auctions Redux," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 78-91.
  7. John Asker & Estelle Cantillon, 2008. "Properties of scoring auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(1), pages 69-85, March.
  8. Maciej H. Kotowski & Fei Li, 2012. "On the Continuous Equilibria of Affiliated-Value, All-Pay Auctions with Private Budget Constraints, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-043, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 05 Aug 2013.
  9. Tristan Gagnon-Bartsch & Marco Pagnozzi & Antonio Rosato, 2021. "Projection of Private Values in Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(10), pages 3256-3298, October.
  10. Chakraborty, Indranil, 2019. "Simultaneous vs. sequential auctions with risk averse bidders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 209-222.
  11. Sano, Ryuji, 2023. "Post-auction investment by financially constrained bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
  12. Kotowski, Maciej H. & Li, Fei, 2014. "On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 84-108.
  13. Baisa, Brian, 2020. "Efficient multi-unit auctions for normal goods," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(1), January.
  14. Kotowski, Maciej H. & Li, Fei, 2014. "The war of attrition and the revelation of valuable information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 124(3), pages 420-423.
  15. Burkett, Justin, 2015. "Endogenous budget constraints in auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 1-20.
  16. Maciej H. Kotowski & Fei Li, 2012. "On the Continuous Equilibria of Affiliated-Value, All-Pay Auctions with Private Budget Constraints, Third Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 14-001, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 10 Jan 2014.
  17. Marilyn Pease & Mark Whitmeyer, 2026. "On Risk Aversion in Auctions," Papers 2603.09683, arXiv.org.
  18. Monteiro, Paulo Klinger & Svaiter, Benar Fux, 2010. "Optimal auction with a general distribution: Virtual valuation without densities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 21-31, January.
  19. Baisa, Brian, 2016. "Overbidding and inefficiencies in multi-unit Vickrey auctions for normal goods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 23-35.
  20. Kotowski, Maciej H., 2020. "First-price auctions with budget constraints," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(1), January.
  21. Itzhak Rasooly & Carlos Gavidia-Calderon, 2020. "The importance of being discrete: on the inaccuracy of continuous approximations in auction theory," Papers 2006.03016, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2022.
  22. Vasserman, Shoshana & Watt, Mitchell, 2021. "Risk aversion and auction design: Theoretical and empirical evidence," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
  23. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian & Kim, Jinwoo, 2013. "Efficient assignment mechanisms for liquidity-constrained agents," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 659-665.
  24. Rene Kirkegaard, 2011. "Ranking Asymmetric Auctions using the Dispersive Order," Working Papers 1101, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
  25. Guillaume Pommey, 2021. "Partnership Dissolution with Cash-Constrained Agents," CEIS Research Paper 514, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 10 Oct 2021.
  26. Dastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh & Jain, Sonakshi, 2023. "Favouritism and corruption in procurement auctions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 10-24.
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