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Citations for "Conditionality and Ownership in IMF Lending: A Political Economy Approach"

by Allan Drazen

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  1. Axel Dreher & Silvia Marchesi, 2013. "Information Transmission and Ownership Consolidation in Aid Programs," CESifo Working Paper Series 4437, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Drazen, Allan & Limão, Nuno, 2003. "Government Gains from Self-Restraint: A Bargaining Theory of Inefficient Redistribution Policies," CEPR Discussion Papers 4007, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Gonçalves, Carlos Eduardo & Guimarães, Bernardo, 2012. "Sovereign default risk and commitment for fiscal adjustment," CEPR Discussion Papers 9163, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Ozlem Arpac & Graham Bird, 2009. "Turkey and the IMF: A case study in the political economy of policy implementation," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 135-157, June.
  5. Marchesi, Silvia & Sabani, Laura & Dreher, Axel, 2009. "Read my lips: The role of information transmission in multilateral reform design," Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers 86, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
  6. Wolfgang Mayer & Alex Mourmouras, 2005. "On the Viability of Conditional Assistance Programs," IMF Working Papers 05/121, International Monetary Fund.
  7. Jeffrey M. Chwieroth, 2012. ""The silent revolution": how the staff exercise informal governance over IMF lending," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 46623, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  8. Öhler, Hannes & Nunnenkamp, Peter & Dreher, Axel, 2012. "Does conditionality work? A test for an innovative US aid scheme," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 138-153.
  9. Jeffrey Chwieroth, 2013. "“The silent revolution:” How the staff exercise informal governance over IMF lending," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 265-290, June.
  10. Bessma Momani, 2007. "IMF staff: Missing link in fund reform proposals," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 39-57, March.
  11. Allan Drazen & Nuno Limão, 2004. "Government Gains from Self-Restraint: A Bargaining Theory of Inefficient Redistribution," NBER Working Papers 10375, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Axel Dreher, 2008. "IMF Conditionality: Theory and Evidence," KOF Working papers 08-188, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
  13. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2013. "Economics versus Politics: Pitfalls of Policy Advice," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 27(2), pages 173-92, Spring.
  14. Silvia Marchesi & Laura Sabani, 2005. "IMF Concern for Reputation and Conditional Lending Failure: Theory and Empirics," Development Working Papers 206, Centro Studi Luca d\'Agliano, University of Milano.
  15. Graham Bird, 2008. "The implementation of IMF programs: A conceptual framework," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 41-64, March.
  16. James Boyce, 2008. "Post-Conflict Recovery: Resource Mobilization and Peacebuilding," Working Papers wp159, Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts at Amherst.
  17. Spiros Bougheas & Indraneel Dasgupta & Oliver Morrissey, 2007. "Tough love or unconditional charity?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(4), pages 561-582, October.
  18. Presbitero, Andrea F., 2008. "Debt Relief Effectiveness and Institution Building," MPRA Paper 12597, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  19. Alex Mourmouras & Peter Rangazas, 2004. "Conditional Lending Under Altruism," IMF Working Papers 04/100, International Monetary Fund.
  20. Markus Jorra, 2010. "The Effect of IMF Lending on the Probability of Sovereign Debt Crises," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201026, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  21. Oscar Calvo-Gonzalez, 2007. "Ownership and conditionality in IMF-supported programs: Back to Per Jacobsson’s time," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 2(4), pages 329-343, December.
  22. Marchesi, Silvia & Sabani, Laura, 2006. "Prolonged Use and Conditionality Failure: Investigating IMF Responsibility," Working Paper Series RP2006/11, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
  23. ORASTEAN Ramona, 2014. "The Lending Arrangements Of The Imf In European Union In Times Of Crisis – Characteristics And Evolutions," Studies in Business and Economics, Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu, Faculty of Economic Sciences, vol. 9(1), pages 134-141, April.
  24. Weithoner, Thomas, 2006. "How can IMF policy eliminate country moral hazard and account for externalities?," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(8), pages 1257-1276, December.
  25. Molly Bauer & Cesi Cruz & Benjamin Graham, 2012. "Democracies only: When do IMF agreements serve as a seal of approval?," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 33-58, March.
  26. Silvia Marchesi & Laura Sabani, 2005. "Prolonged Use and Conditionality Failure: Investigating the IMF Responsibility," Development Working Papers 202, Centro Studi Luca d\'Agliano, University of Milano.
  27. Temple, Jonathan R.W., 2010. "Aid and Conditionality," Handbook of Development Economics, Elsevier.
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