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Citations for "Conditionality and Ownership in IMF Lending: A Political Economy Approach"

by Allan Drazen

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  1. Gonçalves, Carlos Eduardo & Guimaraes, Bernardo, 2015. "Sovereign default risk and commitment for fiscal adjustment," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 68-82.
  2. Öhler, Hannes & Nunnenkamp, Peter & Dreher, Axel, 2012. "Does conditionality work? A test for an innovative US aid scheme," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 138-153.
  3. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2013. "Economics versus Politics: Pitfalls of Policy Advice," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 27(2), pages 173-192, Spring.
  4. Bougheas, Spiros & Dasgupta, Indraneel & Morrissey, Oliver, 2009. "Repayment versus Investment Conditions and Exclusivity in Lending Contracts," IZA Discussion Papers 4604, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  5. Marchesi, Silvia & Sabani, Laura, 2007. "IMF concern for reputation and conditional lending failure: Theory and empirics," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 640-666, November.
  6. Weithoner, Thomas, 2006. "How can IMF policy eliminate country moral hazard and account for externalities?," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(8), pages 1257-1276, December.
  7. Temple, Jonathan R.W., 2010. "Aid and Conditionality," Handbook of Development Economics, Elsevier.
  8. Axel Dreher & Silvia Marchesi, 2013. "Information Transmission and Ownership Consolidation in Aid Programs," CESifo Working Paper Series 4437, CESifo Group Munich.
  9. Axel Dreher, 2008. "IMF Conditionality: Theory and Evidence," KOF Working papers 08-188, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
  10. Silvia Marchesi & Laura Sabani & Axel Dreher, 2009. "Read my lips: the role of information transmission in multilateral reform design," Courant Research Centre: Poverty, Equity and Growth - Discussion Papers 4, Courant Research Centre PEG.
  11. Silvia Marchesi & Laura Sabani, 2005. "Prolonged Use and Conditionality Failure: Investigating the IMF Responsibility," Development Working Papers 202, Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano, University of Milano.
  12. Barry Eichengreen & Ngaire Woods, 2016. "The IMF's Unmet Challenges," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 30(1), pages 29-52, Winter.
  13. Oscar Calvo-Gonzalez, 2007. "Ownership and conditionality in IMF-supported programs: Back to Per Jacobsson’s time," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 2(4), pages 329-343, December.
  14. Presbitero, Andrea F., 2008. "Debt Relief Effectiveness and Institution Building," MPRA Paper 12597, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  15. Wolfgang Mayer & Alex Mourmouras, 2005. "On the Viability of Conditional Assistance Programs," IMF Working Papers 05/121, International Monetary Fund.
  16. ORASTEAN Ramona, 2014. "The Lending Arrangements Of The Imf In European Union In Times Of Crisis – Characteristics And Evolutions," Studies in Business and Economics, Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu, Faculty of Economic Sciences, vol. 9(1), pages 134-141, April.
  17. Calliope Spanou, 2016. "Policy conditionality, structural adjustment and the domestic policy system. Conceptual framework and research agenda," RSCAS Working Papers 2016/60, European University Institute.
  18. Marchesi, Silvia & Sabani, Laura, 2006. "Prolonged Use and Conditionality Failure: Investigating IMF Responsibility," WIDER Working Papers RP2006/11, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
  19. Spiros Bougheas & Indraneel Dasgupta & Oliver Morrissey, 2007. "Tough love or unconditional charity?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(4), pages 561-582, October.
  20. Allan Drazen & Nuno Limão, 2004. "Government Gains from Self-Restraint: A Bargaining Theory of Inefficient Redistribution," NBER Working Papers 10375, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  21. Ozlem Arpac & Graham Bird, 2009. "Turkey and the IMF: A case study in the political economy of policy implementation," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 135-157, June.
  22. James Boyce, 2008. "Post-Conflict Recovery: Resource Mobilization and Peacebuilding," Working Papers wp159, Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts at Amherst.
  23. Graham Bird, 2008. "The implementation of IMF programs: A conceptual framework," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 41-64, March.
  24. Drazen, Allan & Limão, Nuno, 2003. "Government Gains from Self-Restraint: A Bargaining Theory of Inefficient Redistribution Policies," CEPR Discussion Papers 4007, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  25. Bessma Momani, 2007. "IMF staff: Missing link in fund reform proposals," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 39-57, March.
  26. Jorra, Markus, 2012. "The effect of IMF lending on the probability of sovereign debt crises," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 709-725.
  27. Jeffrey Chwieroth, 2013. "“The silent revolution:” How the staff exercise informal governance over IMF lending," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 265-290, June.
  28. Molly Bauer & Cesi Cruz & Benjamin Graham, 2012. "Democracies only: When do IMF agreements serve as a seal of approval?," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 33-58, March.
  29. Jeffrey M. Chwieroth, 2012. ""The silent revolution": how the staff exercise informal governance over IMF lending," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 46623, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  30. Alex Mourmouras & Peter Rangazas, 2004. "Conditional Lending Under Altruism," IMF Working Papers 04/100, International Monetary Fund.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.