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Ownership and the Production Function

Citations

Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. #tbt Shapley & Shubik 1964 Ownership and the Production Function
    by Mike Isaacson in Vulgar Economics on 2015-07-02 19:00:00

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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Cited by:

  1. Josep M. Izquierdo & Jesús Montes & Carlos Rafels, 2024. "Population Lorenz-monotonic allocation schemes for TU-games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 63(2), pages 417-436, September.
  2. Pongou, Roland & Tondji, Jean-Baptiste, 2018. "Valuing inputs under supply uncertainty: The Bayesian Shapley value," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 206-224.
  3. Gardner, Roy, 1976. "Shapley Value And Disadvantageous Monopoly," ISU General Staff Papers 197610010700001041, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  4. Aguiar, Victor H. & Pongou, Roland & Tondji, Jean-Baptiste, 2018. "A non-parametric approach to testing the axioms of the Shapley value with limited data," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 41-63.
  5. Arin, J. & Feltkamp, V., 2012. "Coalitional games: Monotonicity and core," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 216(1), pages 208-213.
  6. Qianqian Kong & Hao Sun & Genjiu Xu & Dongshuang Hou, 2019. "Associated Games to Optimize the Core of a Transferable Utility Game," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 182(2), pages 816-836, August.
  7. Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, 2007. "Power," Department of Economics University of Siena 495, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
  8. Okada, Akira, 2011. "Coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: Theory and application," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 227-235, September.
  9. Nieva, Ricardo, "undated". "The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution with Simultaneous Payoff Demands," Climate Change and Sustainable Development 206838, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
  10. Peter Borm & Herbert Hamers & Ruud Hendrickx, 2001. "Operations research games: A survey," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 9(2), pages 139-199, December.
  11. Stuart, Harborne Jr., 2007. "Buyer symmetry in monopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 615-630, June.
  12. Alberto Bucci & Philip Ushchev, 2016. "Specialization vs Competition: An Anatomy of Increasing Returns to Scale," HSE Working papers WP BRP 134/EC/2016, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
  13. Li Zhang & Genjiu Xu & Hao Sun & Wenzhong Li, 2024. "Cohesive players: characterizations of a subclass of efficient, symmetric, and linear values," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 332(1), pages 765-779, January.
  14. Meca, Ana & Timmer, Judith & Garcia-Jurado, Ignacio & Borm, Peter, 2004. "Inventory games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 156(1), pages 127-139, July.
    • Meca-Martinez, A. & Timmer, J.B. & Garcia-Jurado, I. & Borm, P.E.M., 1999. "Inventory Games," Other publications TiSEM 21f26b3f-7fae-4f19-908f-a, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    • Meca, A. & Timmer, J.B. & Garcia-Jurado, I. & Borm, P.E.M., 2004. "Inventory games," Other publications TiSEM 49368f2d-02fc-49c9-9d74-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    • Meca-Martinez, A. & Timmer, J.B. & Garcia-Jurado, I. & Borm, P.E.M., 1999. "Inventory Games," Discussion Paper 1999-53, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  15. repec:ehu:ikerla:11102 is not listed on IDEAS
  16. J. Arin & V. Feltkamp & M. Montero, 2015. "A bargaining procedure leading to the serial rule in games with veto players," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 229(1), pages 41-66, June.
  17. Daniel Arce, 1995. "Social norms and core outcomes in a sharecropping economy," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 61(2), pages 175-183, June.
  18. Behzad Hezarkhani & Wiesław Kubiak, 2013. "Transshipment games with identical newsvendors and cooperation costs," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 78(3), pages 315-339, December.
  19. Kenneth Arrow, 1970. "Political and Economic Evaluation of Social Effects and Externalities," NBER Chapters, in: The Analysis of Public Output, pages 1-30, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  20. Dinko Dimitrov & Ching-jen Sun, 2025. "Blend-in fairness and equal split," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 54(2), pages 1-21, December.
  21. Lee, Joosung & Driessen, Theo S.H., 2012. "Sequentially two-leveled egalitarianism for TU games: Characterization and application," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 220(3), pages 736-743.
  22. Elena Iñarra & Roberto Serrano & Ken-Ichi Shimomura, 2020. "The Nucleolus, the Kernel, and the Bargaining Set: An Update," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 71(2), pages 225-266.
  23. Philip Ushchev, 2015. "The sources of sharing externalities: Specialization vs Competition," ERSA conference papers ersa15p1395, European Regional Science Association.
  24. Victor Aguiar & Roland Pongou & Jean-Baptiste Tondji, 2016. "Measuring and Decomposing the Distance to the Shapley Wage Function with Limited Data," Working Papers 1613e, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
  25. Alberto Bucci & Philip Ushchev, 2021. "Specialization versus competition: an anatomy of increasing returns to scale," Journal of Economic Geography, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(3), pages 461-486.
  26. Béal, Sylvain & Ferrières, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe, 2018. "The proportional Shapley value and applications," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 93-112.
  27. Gardner, Roy, 1976. "Shapley Value and Monopoly Power In A Two-Sector Model," ISU General Staff Papers 197607010700001039, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  28. Dylan Laplace Mermoud, 2023. "Geometry of Set Functions in Game Theory: Combinatorial and Computational Aspects," Papers 2301.02950, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2023.
  29. Martin Shubik, 1974. "The General Equilibrium Model: Barter and Trust, or Mass Markets with Money and Credit," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 50(2), pages 245-258, June.
  30. Flåm, Sjur Didrik, 2016. "Borch’s theorem, equal margins, and efficient allocation," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 162-168.
  31. repec:rnp:ecopol:ep1315 is not listed on IDEAS
  32. Stuart Jr., Harborne W., 2007. "Creating monopoly power," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 1011-1025, October.
  33. Routledge, R.R., 2014. "Deviations, uncertainty and the core," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 286-297.
  34. Pierre Dehez, 2024. "Cooperative Product Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 26(01), pages 1-13, March.
  35. Naoki Watanabe & Shigeo Muto, 2008. "Stable profit sharing in a patent licensing game: general bargaining outcomes," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 37(4), pages 505-523, December.
  36. Pongou, Roland & Tchantcho, Bertrand & Tedjeugang, Narcisse, 2015. "Trial-Based Tournament: Rank and Earnings," MPRA Paper 65582, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  37. Pradeep Dubey & Martin Shubik, 1978. "A Theory of Money and Financial Institutions. Part 37. The Profit Maximizing Firm: Managers and Stockholders," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 483, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  38. repec:ehu:ikerla:34464 is not listed on IDEAS
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