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On the Social Optimality of Liquidated Damage Clauses: An Economic Analysis

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Ottorino Chillemi & Claudio Mezzetti, 2014. "Optimal procurement mechanisms: bidding on price and damages for breach," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 55(2), pages 335-355, February.
  2. Kaplow, Louis & Shapiro, Carl, 2007. "Antitrust," Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 15, pages 1073-1225, Elsevier.
  3. Jihong Lee, 2005. "Incomplete Information, Renegotiation, and Breach of Contract," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(5), pages 1-7.
  4. Liu, Zhiyong & Avraham, Ronen, 2012. "Ex ante versus ex post expectation damages," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 339-355.
  5. Hori, Kazumi, 2008. "The role of private benefits in information acquisition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(3-4), pages 626-631, December.
  6. Edlin, Aaron S & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1996. "Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 478-501, June.
  7. Eberhard Feess & Michael Gerfin & Gerd Muehlheusser, 2015. "Contracts As Rent‐Seeking Devices: Evidence From German Soccer," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 53(1), pages 714-730, January.
  8. Hatzis, Aristides N., 2002. "Having the cake and eating it too: efficient penalty clauses in Common and Civil contract law," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 381-406, December.
  9. Yuxun Zhou & Mohammad Mafizur Rahman & Rasheda Khanam & Brad R. Taylor, 2023. "Alternative Method to Resolve the Principal–Principal Conflict—A New Perspective Based on Contract Theory and Negotiation," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(2), pages 1-30, January.
  10. Jorge Montesinos & Eduardo Saavedra, 2012. "Algunos Alcances en torno a la Institucionalidad y Renegociación de Concesiones en la Infraestructura de Transporte de Uso Público en Perú," ILADES-UAH Working Papers inv277, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Business.
  11. Hori, Kazumi & 堀, 一三, 2006. "The Bright Side of Private Benefits," Discussion Papers 2006-01, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  12. MacKenzie, Ian A. & Ohndorf, Markus, 2013. "Restricted Coasean bargaining," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 296-307.
  13. Edwin Leuven & Hessel Oosterbeek & Randolph Sloof & Chris van Klaveren, 2002. "Worker Reciprocity and Employer Investment in Training," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 02-090/3, Tinbergen Institute.
  14. Fumagalli, Chiara & Motta, Massimo & Ronde, Thomas, 2009. "Exclusive Dealing: The Interaction between Foreclosure and Investment Promotion," Institutions and Markets Papers 56213, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
  15. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2005:i:5:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
  16. Comino, Stefano & Nicolò, Antonio & Tedeschi, Piero, 2010. "Termination clauses in partnerships," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(5), pages 718-732, July.
  17. Michele Moretto & Gianpaolo Rossini, 1996. "Profit sharing regulation and repeated bargaining with a shut-down option," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 2(1), pages 339-368, December.
  18. Philip Bond, 2008. "Persistent Court Corruption," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(531), pages 1333-1353, August.
  19. Ronen Avraham & Zhiyong Liu, 2006. "Incomplete Contracts with Asymmetric Information: Exclusive Versus Optional Remedies," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 8(3), pages 523-561.
  20. Fan Zhang, 2008. "Dynamic Contract Breach," EAG Discussions Papers 200803, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.
  21. J. Luis Guasch, 2004. "Granting and Renegotiating Infrastructure Concessions : Doing it Right," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 15024, April.
  22. Seshimo, Hiroyuki, 2003. "Optimal tenant protection," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 59-92, January.
  23. Bond, Philip & Newman, Andrew F., 2009. "Prohibitions on punishments in private contracts," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 526-540, October.
  24. Burguet, Roberto & Caminal, Ramon & Matutes, Carmen, 1999. "Golden Cages for Showy Birds: Optimal Switching Costs in Labour Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 2070, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  25. Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2006. "Regulating Damage Clauses in (Labor) Contracts," IZA Discussion Papers 2367, IZA Network @ LISER.
  26. Comino, Stefano & Nicolò, Antonio & Tedeschi, Piero, 2010. "Termination clauses in partnerships," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(5), pages 718-732, July.
  27. David Meza & Mariano Selvaggi, 2007. "Exclusive contracts foster relationship-specific investment," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(1), pages 85-97, March.
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