The Bright Side of Private Benefits
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References listed on IDEAS
- Helmut Bester & Roland Strausz, "undated". "Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle," Papers 004, Departmental Working Papers.
- Cremer, Jacques & Khalil, Fahad & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1998.
"Strategic Information Gathering before a Contract Is Offered,"
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More about this item
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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