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The Importance of Ordering in Sequential Auctions

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Harrison Hong & Ilan Kremer & Jeffrey D. Kubik & Jianping Mei & Michael Moses, 2015. "Ordering, revenue and anchoring in art auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(1), pages 186-216, March.
  2. Hikmet Gunay & Xin Meng & Victor Perez, 2024. "Selling Order in a Sequential Auction," ISER Discussion Paper 1271, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka.
  3. Budde, Maximilian & Minner, Stefan, 2015. "Optimal capacity provision for service providers with subsequent auctioning of projects," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 170(PB), pages 652-662.
  4. Leon Yang Chu, 2009. "Truthful Bundle/Multiunit Double Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 55(7), pages 1184-1198, July.
  5. J. Reiß & Jens Schöndube, 2010. "First-price equilibrium and revenue equivalence in a sequential procurement auction model," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 43(1), pages 99-141, April.
  6. Pitchik, Carolyn, 2009. "Budget-constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 928-949, July.
  7. Muramoto, Akitoshi & Sano, Ryuji, 2016. "Sequential auctions of heterogeneous objects," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 49-51.
  8. Paul Schweinzer, 2008. "Labour market recruiting with intermediaries," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 12(2), pages 119-127, June.
  9. Leon Yang Chu & Zuo-Jun Max Shen, 2008. "Truthful Double Auction Mechanisms," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 56(1), pages 102-120, February.
  10. Meng, Xin & Gunay, Hikmet, 2022. "Different Number of Bidders in Sequential Auctions," Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, vol. 63(1), pages 72-85, June.
  11. Dongwoo Kim & Kyoo il Kim & Pallavi Pal, 2026. "Partial Identification of the Valuation Distribution in Sequential English Auctions," Papers 2605.14400, arXiv.org.
  12. Schweinzer, Paul, 2006. "Labour market screening with intermediaries," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 138, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  13. Romero Morales, Dolores & Steinberg, Richard, 2014. "Revenue deficiency under second-price auctions in a supply-chain setting," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 233(1), pages 131-144.
  14. Dennis Clerck & Erik Demeulemeester, 2016. "A sequential procurement model for a PPP project pipeline," OR Spectrum: Quantitative Approaches in Management, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research e.V., vol. 38(2), pages 427-457, March.
  15. Dongwoo Kim & Kyoo il Kim & Pallavi Pal, 2026. "Partial identification of the valuation distribution in sequential English auctions," CeMMAP working papers 08/26, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
  16. Wedad Elmaghraby, 2005. "The Effect of Asymmetric Bidder Size on an Auction's Performance: Are More Bidders Always Better?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(12), pages 1763-1776, December.
  17. Zhi Chen & Jürgen Mihm & Jochen Schlapp, 2025. "Sourcing Innovation: When to Own and When to Control Your Supplier," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 27(6), pages 1869-1888, November.
  18. Cem Ozturk, O. & Karabatı, Selçuk, 2017. "A decision support framework for evaluating revenue performance in sequential purchase contexts," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 263(3), pages 922-934.
  19. Jin, Mingzhou & Wu, S. David & Erkoc, Murat, 2006. "Multiple unit auctions with economies and diseconomies of scale," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 174(2), pages 816-834, October.
  20. Verwer, S. & Zhang, Y., 2011. "Revenue Prediction in Budget-constrained Sequential Auctions with Complementarities," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2011-020-LIS, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
  21. Landi Massimiliano & Menicucci Domenico, 2019. "Sequential Auctions with Decreasing Reserve Prices," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 19(1), pages 1-25, January.
  22. Fanqi Shi & Yiqing Xing, 2022. "Implementing optimal outcomes through sequential auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(4), pages 703-732, December.
  23. Paul Pezanis-Christou, 2013. "Asymmetric Multiple-Object First-Price Auctions," Adelaide Economics Working Papers 2013-07, Adelaide University, School of Economics.
  24. Bougt, Daniel & Ghosh, Gagan & Liu, Heng, 2023. "Identification of interdependent values in sequential first-price auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
  25. Archishman Chakraborty & Nandini Gupta & Rick Harbaugh, 2006. "Best foot forward or best for last in a sequential auction?," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(1), pages 176-194, March.
  26. Amar Cheema & Dipankar Chakravarti & Atanu R. Sinha, 2012. "Bidding Behavior in Descending and Ascending Auctions," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 31(5), pages 779-800, September.
  27. Ramanathan Subramaniam & R. Venkatesh, 2009. "Optimal Bundling Strategies in Multiobject Auctions of Complements or Substitutes," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 28(2), pages 264-273, 03-04.
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