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Models of policy under stochastic replanning

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Joseph G. Haubrich & Joseph A. Ritter, 1996. "Dynamic commitment and imperfect policy rules," Working Paper 9601, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  2. A. Hakan Kara, 2007. "Monetary Policy under Imperfect Commitment: Reconciling Theory with Evidence," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 3(1), pages 149-178, March.
  3. Dennis, Richard, 2014. "Imperfect credibility and robust monetary policy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 218-234.
  4. Gersbach, Hans & Liu, Yulin & Tischhauser, Martin, 2018. "Versatile Forward Guidance: Escaping or Switching?," CEPR Discussion Papers 12559, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Nunes, Ricardo, 2008. "Delegation and Loose Commitment," MPRA Paper 11555, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Chatelain, Jean-Bernard & Ralf, Kirsten, 2017. "Can we Identify the Fed's Preferences?," EconStor Preprints 149993, ZBW - German National Library of Economics.
  7. Bodenstein, Martin & Hebden, James & Nunes, Ricardo, 2012. "Imperfect credibility and the zero lower bound," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 135-149.
  8. Chatelain, Jean-Bernard & Ralf, Kirsten, 2017. "Hopf Bifurcation from new-Keynesian Taylor rule to Ramsey Optimal Policy," EconStor Preprints 158001, ZBW - German National Library of Economics.
  9. Fabrizio Zampolli & Andrew Blake, 2005. "Time Consistent Policy in Markov Switching Models," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2005 2, Money Macro and Finance Research Group.
  10. Lakdawala, Aeimit & Wu, Shu, 2017. "Federal Reserve Credibility and the Term Structure of Interest Rates," MPRA Paper 78253, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  11. Debortoli, Davide & Nunes, Ricardo, 2010. "Fiscal policy under loose commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(3), pages 1005-1032, May.
  12. Alex Haberis & Richard Harrison & Matt Waldron, 2014. "Transitory interest-rate pegs under imperfect credibility," Discussion Papers 1422, Centre for Macroeconomics (CFM).
  13. Givens, Gregory E., 2016. "On the gains from monetary policy commitment under deep habits," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 19-36.
  14. Yang Lu & Ernesto Pasten & Robert King, 2013. "Policy design with private sector skepticism in the textbook New Keynesian model," 2013 Meeting Papers 241, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  15. repec:eee:eecrev:v:100:y:2017:i:c:p:364-389 is not listed on IDEAS
  16. Davide Debortoli & Ricardo Nunes, 2011. "Monetary regime switches and unstable objectives," International Finance Discussion Papers 1036, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  17. Himmels, Christoph & Kirsanova, Tatiana, 2011. "Expectations Traps and Monetary Policy with Limited Commitment," MPRA Paper 29208, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  18. Lu, Yang K. & King, Robert G. & Pasten, Ernesto, 2016. "Optimal reputation building in the New Keynesian model," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 233-249.
  19. Alex Clymo & Andrea Lanteri, 2016. "Fiscal Policy with Limited-Time Commitment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 16-056/VI, Tinbergen Institute.
  20. Davide Debortoli & Junior Maih & Ricardo Nunes, 2010. "Loose commitment in medium-scale macroeconomic models: Theory and an application," Working Paper 2010/25, Norges Bank.
  21. Schaumburg, Ernst & Tambalotti, Andrea, 2007. "An investigation of the gains from commitment in monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 302-324, March.
  22. A. Hakan Kara, 2004. "Optimal Monetary Policy, Commitment, and Imperfect Credibility," Central Bank Review, Research and Monetary Policy Department, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, vol. 4(1), pages 31-66.
  23. Himmels, Christoph & Kirsanova, Tatiana, 2013. "Escaping expectation traps: How much commitment is required?," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 649-665.
  24. Joseph G. Haubrich & Joseph A. Ritter, 1992. "Commitment as irreversible investment," Working Paper 9217, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  25. KARA Hakan, "undated". "Optimal Monetary Policy Rules under Imperfect Commitment: Reconciling Theory with Evidence," EcoMod2003 330700077, EcoMod.
  26. Kasa, Kenneth, 2002. "Model Uncertainty, Robust Policies, And The Value Of Commitment," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 6(01), pages 145-166, February.
  27. Debortoli, Davide & Maih, Junior & Nunes, Ricardo, 2014. "Loose Commitment In Medium-Scale Macroeconomic Models: Theory And Applications," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(01), pages 175-198, January.
  28. William Roberds, 1986. "Solution of linear-quadratic- Gaussian dynamic games using variational methods," Staff Report 105, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  29. Kasa, Kenneth, 1998. "Optimal policy with limited commitment," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 22(6), pages 887-910, June.
  30. Christian Matthes, 2015. "Figuring Out the Fed—Beliefs about Policymakers and Gains from Transparency," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 47(1), pages 1-29, February.
  31. Davide Debortoli & Ricardo Nunes, 2008. "The macroeconomic effect of external pressures on monetary policy," International Finance Discussion Papers 944, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  32. Eurilton Araújo, 2016. "Monetary Policy Credibility and the Comovement between Stock Returns and Inflation," Working Papers Series 449, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department.
  33. Andrew P Blake & Fabrizio Zampolli, 2006. "Optimal monetary policy in Markov-switching models with rational expectations agents," Bank of England working papers 298, Bank of England.
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