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After You Sir. Hold-Up, Direct Externalities, and Sequential Investment

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2007. "Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 74(296), pages 573-585, November.
  2. Gaucher, Séverine & Soler, Louis-Georges & Tanguy, Hervé, 2002. "Incitation à la qualité dans la relation vignoble-négoce," Cahiers d'Economie et de Sociologie Rurales (CESR), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA), vol. 62.
  3. M'hand Fares, 2006. "Renegotiation Design and Contract Solutions to the Hold‐Up Problem," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(5), pages 731-756, December.
  4. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2003. "Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R&D alliances," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 153-173, April.
  5. Patrick W Schmitz, 2022. "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus at-will Contracts," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 132(647), pages 2563-2577.
  6. Chen, Bin R. & Chiu, Y. Stephen, 2010. "Public-private partnerships: Task interdependence and contractibility," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(6), pages 591-603, November.
  7. Göller, Daniel & Stremitzer, Alexander, 2014. "Breach remedies inducing hybrid investments," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 26-38.
  8. Manuel Willington, 2013. "Hold Up Under Costly Litigation and Imperfect Courts of Law," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 29(5), pages 1023-1055, October.
  9. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 101(3), pages 268-271, December.
  10. Alexander Stremitzer, 2012. "Standard Breach Remedies, Quality Thresholds, and Cooperative Investments," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 28(2), pages 337-359.
  11. Alan Schwartz, 2004. "The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 20(1), pages 2-31, April.
  12. Chaserant, Camille, 2007. "Les fondements incomplets de l’incomplétude : Une revue critique de la théorie des contrats incomplets," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 83(2), pages 227-253, juin.
  13. Che, Yeon-Koo, 2000. "Can a Contract Solve Hold-Up When Investments Have Externalities? A Comment on De Fraja (1999)," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 195-205, November.
  14. Buzard, Kristy & ,, 2012. "Contract, renegotiation, and hold up: Results on the technology of trade and investment," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(2), May.
  15. Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, 2000. "Economic and Legal Aspects of Costly Recontracting," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm143, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Jan 2001.
  16. Schmitz, Patrick W, 2001. "The Hold-up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(1), pages 1-17, January.
  17. Xhoxhi, Orjon & Pedersen, Søren Marcus & Lind, Kim Martin & Yazar, Attila, 2014. "The Determinants of Intermediaries’ Power over Farmers’ Margin-Related Activities: Evidence from Adana, Turkey," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 815-827.
  18. Tamada, Yasunari & Tsai, Tsung-Sheng, 2014. "Delegating the decision-making authority to terminate a sequential project," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 178-194.
  19. Vladimir Smirnov & Andrew Wait, 2004. "Hold-up and Sequential Specific Investments," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(2), pages 386-400, Summer.
  20. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(2), pages 315-329, October.
  21. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(1), pages 119-122, April.
  22. Séverine Gaucher & Louis-Georges Soler & Hervé Tanguy, 2002. "Incitation à la qualité dans la relation vignoble-négoce," Cahiers d'Economie et Sociologie Rurales, INRA Department of Economics, vol. 62, pages 7-40.
  23. Maxim Mai & Vladimir Smirnov & Andrew Wait, 2014. "Ownership, Access, and Sequential Investment," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 47(1), pages 203-231, February.
  24. Evelyn Korn & Stephan Meisenzahl, 2009. "Contracting still matters! Or: How to design a letter of intent," MAGKS Papers on Economics 200909, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  25. Séverine Gaucher & Louis-Georges Soler & Hervé Tanguy, 2002. "Incitation à la qualité dans la relation vignoble-négoce," Post-Print hal-01200937, HAL.
  26. Göller, Daniel & Stremitzer, Alexander, 2009. "Breach Remedies Including Hybrid Investments," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 282, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  27. Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, "undated". "The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting," Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Paper Series yale_lepp-1004, Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy.
  28. Brooks, Richard & Stremitzer, Alexander, 2009. "On and Off Contract Remedies," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 290, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  29. Smirnov, Vladimir & Wait, Andrew, 2004. "Timing of investments, holdup and total welfare," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 413-425, March.
  30. Buzard, Kristy & ,, 2012. "Contract, renegotiation, and hold up: Results on the technology of trade and investment," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(2), May.
  31. Kyoungwon Rhee, 2007. "The Value of Contracting with the Sequential Investments: The Role of Outside Values," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 23, pages 89-110.
  32. Richard R.W. Brooks & Alexander Stremitzer, 2012. "On and Off Contract Remedies Inducing Cooperative Investments," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(2), pages 488-516.
  33. Fares, M’hand, 2005. "Quels fondements à l’incomplétude des contrats?," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 81(3), pages 535-555, Septembre.
  34. Seshimo, Hiroyuki, 2003. "Optimal tenant protection," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 59-92, January.
  35. Castaneda, Marco A., 2006. "The hold-up problem in a repeated relationship," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(5), pages 953-970, September.
  36. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2005:i:28:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
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