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Information Transmission When the Informed Party Is Confused

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Weksler, Ran & Zik, Boaz, 2025. "The economics of excuses: Job market cheap talk with pre-employment tests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 56-64.
  2. Goltsman, Maria & Pavlov, Gregory, 2014. "Communication in Cournot oligopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 152-176.
  3. Irene Valsecchi, 2013. "The expert problem: a survey," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 303-331, November.
  4. Chen, Ying, 2012. "Value of public information in sender–receiver games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 114(3), pages 343-345.
  5. Moreno de Barreda, Inés, 2024. "Cheap talk with two-sided private information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 97-118.
  6. Ascensión Andina‐Díaz, 2012. "Screening and Signaling in Communication," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 114(2), pages 480-499, June.
  7. Alderighi, Marco & Nicolini, Marcella, 2022. "Strategic information disclosure in vertical markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
  8. Junichiro Ishida & Takashi Shimizu, 2009. "Cheap Talk with an Informed Receiver," ISER Discussion Paper 0746, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka.
  9. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/5adcidkke9omt0s9p6m01j1rh is not listed on IDEAS
  10. Ying Chen & Sidartha Gordon, 2015. "Information transmission in nested sender–receiver games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(3), pages 543-569, April.
  11. Bijkerk, Suzanne H. & Karamychev, Vladimir & Swank, Otto H., 2018. "When words are not enough," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 294-314.
  12. Amir Habibi, 2023. "Communicating Preferences to Improve Recommendations," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 394, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
  13. Frédéric Koessler & Françoise Forges, 2008. "Multistage Communication With And Without Verifiable Types," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 10(02), pages 145-164.
  14. Oded Berman & Mohammad M. Fazel-Zarandi & Dmitry Krass, 2019. "Truthful Cheap Talk: Why Operational Flexibility May Lead to Truthful Communication," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(4), pages 1624-1641, April.
  15. Maxim Ivanov, 2024. "Perfect robust implementation by private information design," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 78(3), pages 753-787, November.
  16. Pedro M. Gardete & Yakov Bart, 2018. "Tailored Cheap Talk: The Effects of Privacy Policy on Ad Content and Market Outcomes," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 37(5), pages 733-752, September.
  17. Ottaviani, Marco & Sorensen, Peter Norman, 2006. "Professional advice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 120-142, January.
  18. Jesse Bull & Joel Watson, 2019. "Statistical evidence and the problem of robust litigation," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 50(4), pages 974-1003, December.
  19. Sandeep Baliga & Stephen Morris, 1998. "Cheap Talk and Co-ordination with Payoff Uncertainty," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1203, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  20. Jeahan Jung & Jeong Yoo Kim, 2024. "Cheap Talk with Transparent and Monotone Motives from a Seller to an Informed Buyer," Games, MDPI, vol. 15(3), pages 1-20, May.
  21. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/5adcidkke9omt0s9p6m01j1rh is not listed on IDEAS
  22. Murali Agastya & Parimal Kanti Bag & Indranil Chakraborty, 2014. "Communication and authority with a partially informed expert," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(1), pages 176-197, March.
  23. Lai, Ernest K., 2014. "Expert advice for amateurs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 1-16.
  24. Yasuyuki Miyahara & Hitoshi Sadakane, 2020. "Communication Enhancement through Information Acquisition by Uninformed Player," KIER Working Papers 1050, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  25. Ying Chen & Sidartha Gordon, 2014. "Information Transmission in Nested Sender-Receiver Games," Sciences Po Economics Discussion Papers hal-00973071, HAL.
  26. Junichiro Ishida & Takashi Shimizu, 2019. "Cheap talk when the receiver has uncertain information sources," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(2), pages 303-334, September.
  27. Aurora García-Gallego & Penélope Hernández-Rojas & Amalia Rodrigo-González, 2019. "Efficient coordination in the lab," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 14(1), pages 175-201, March.
  28. Ying Chen & Sidartha Gordon, 2014. "Information Transmission in Nested Sender-Receiver Games," Sciences Po Economics Publications (main) hal-00973071, HAL.
  29. Ascensión Andina-Díaz, 2015. "Competition and uncertainty in a paper’s news desk," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 116(1), pages 77-93, September.
  30. Francisco Silva, 2020. "Self-evaluations," Documentos de Trabajo 554, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
  31. Harbaugh, Richmond & To, Theodore, 2020. "False modesty: When disclosing good news looks bad," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 43-55.
  32. Boleslavsky, Raphael & Lewis, Tracy R., 2016. "Evolving influence: Mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 110-134.
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