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Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Gao, Lei & Lu, Jingfeng & Wang, Zhewei, 2025. "Move orders in contests: Equilibria and winning chances," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 436-468.
  2. Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2020. "How noise affects effort in tournaments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
  3. David K. Levine & Andrea Mattozzi, 2022. "Success in contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 73(2), pages 595-624, April.
  4. Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2018. "The Optimal Defense Of Networks Of Targets," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(4), pages 2195-2211, October.
  5. Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2019. "The attack and defense of weakest-link networks," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 179(3), pages 175-194, June.
  6. Ewerhart, Christian, 2017. "Revenue ranking of optimally biased contests: The case of two players," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 167-170.
  7. Laica, Christoph & Lauber, Arne & Sahm, Marco, 2021. "Sequential round-robin tournaments with multiple prizes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 421-448.
  8. Dominik Bruckner & Marco Sahm, 2024. "Party Politics: A Contest Perspective," CESifo Working Paper Series 11474, CESifo.
  9. Maria Cubel, 2021. "Generalized difference-form contests," Department of Economics Working Papers 79/21, University of Bath, Department of Economics.
  10. Fu, Qiang & Wang, Xiruo & Wu, Zenan, 2021. "Multi-prize contests with risk-averse players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 513-535.
  11. Barbieri, Stefano & Serena, Marco, 2024. "Winner's effort in multi-battle team contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 526-556.
  12. Feng, Xin & Lu, Jingfeng, 2018. "How to split the pie: Optimal rewards in dynamic multi-battle competitions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 82-95.
  13. Levine, David K. & Mattozzi, Andrea & Modica, Salvatore, 2024. "The tripartite auction folk theorem," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 162(C).
  14. Kawamori, Tomohiko, 2023. "Complete-rent-dissipation contest design," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 232(C).
  15. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Patricia Esteve‐González & Anwesha Mukherjee, 2023. "Heterogeneity, leveling the playing field, and affirmative action in contests," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 89(3), pages 924-974, January.
  16. Fu, Qiang & Wu, Zenan & Zhu, Yuxuan, 2023. "On equilibrium uniqueness in generalized multi-prize nested lottery contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 180-199.
  17. Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2025. "Hunting for the discouragement effect in contests," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 29(3), pages 387-413, September.
  18. Ewerhart, Christian, 2025. "On the uniqueness of the mixed equilibrium in the Tullock contest," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 247(C).
  19. Feng, Xin & Lu, Jingfeng, 2017. "Uniqueness of equilibrium in two-player asymmetric Tullock contests with intermediate discriminatory power," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 61-64.
  20. David K. Levine & Cesar Martinelli, 2024. "Razor‐Thin Mass Elections With High Turnout," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 65(4), pages 1607-1624, November.
  21. Bruckner, Dominik & Sahm, Marco, 2023. "Party Politics: A Contest Perspective," VfS Annual Conference 2023 (Regensburg): Growth and the "sociale Frage" 277714, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  22. Morgan, John & Tumlinson, Justin & Várdy, Felix, 2022. "The limits of meritocracy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
  23. Barbieri, Stefano & Serena, Marco, 2022. "Biasing dynamic contests between ex-ante symmetric players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 1-30.
  24. Deng, Xiaotie & Gafni, Yotam & Lavi, Ron & Lin, Tao & Ling, Hongyi, 2025. "From monopoly to competition: When do optimal contests prevail?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 268-293.
  25. Bo Chen & Shanlin Jin, 2023. "Elimination contests with collusive team players," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(1), pages 61-89, February.
  26. Xiaotie Deng & Yotam Gafni & Ron Lavi & Tao Lin & Hongyi Ling, 2021. "From Monopoly to Competition: Optimal Contests Prevail," Papers 2107.13363, arXiv.org.
  27. David K Levine & Cesar Martinelli & Nicole Stoelinga, 2026. "Vote or Fight?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 11694000000000199, David K. Levine.
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