IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/iecrev/v65y2024i4p1607-1624.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Razor‐Thin Mass Elections With High Turnout

Author

Listed:
  • David K. Levine
  • Cesar Martinelli

Abstract

We argue that traditional voting models fail to fully explain the frequency of very close mass elections with high turnout. Instead, we model elections as a competition between incentive schemes to mobilize voters. We elucidate conditions under which parties might prefer close elections, as the potential to be pivotal motivates voters instead of exclusively costly incentives as in nonclose elections. We show that, under those conditions, better voter targeting results in tighter races and increased turnout. Furthermore, the smaller party often has a strong incentive to commit to strategies that ensure a close election.

Suggested Citation

  • David K. Levine & Cesar Martinelli, 2024. "Razor‐Thin Mass Elections With High Turnout," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 65(4), pages 1607-1624, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:65:y:2024:i:4:p:1607-1624
    DOI: 10.1111/iere.12711
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12711
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/iere.12711?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:65:y:2024:i:4:p:1607-1624. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/deupaus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.