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On a non-cooperative theory of technology transfer

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Mukherjee, Arijit & Balasubramanian, N., 2001. "Technology transfer in a horizontally differentiated product market," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 257-274, September.
  2. Arijit Mukherjee, 2002. "Licensing in a Vertically Separated Industry," Industrial Organization 0211005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Arijit Mukherjee & Soma Mukherjee, 2002. "Licensing and the Incentive for Innovation," Industrial Organization 0211008, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Silipo, Damiano Bruno & Weiss, Avi, 2005. "Cooperation and competition in an R&D market with spillovers," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 41-57, March.
  5. Sen, Debapriya & Stamatopoulos, Giorgos, 2016. "Licensing under general demand and cost functions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 253(3), pages 673-680.
  6. Mukherjee, Arijit & Mukherjee, Soma, 2013. "Technology licensing and innovation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(3), pages 499-502.
  7. Marjit, Sugata & Xu, Xinpeng & Yang, Lei, 2009. "Offshore Outsourcing, Contractual R&D and Intellectual Property in Developing Countries," MPRA Paper 19362, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Nisvan Erkal, 2005. "Optimal Licensing Policy in Differentiated Industries," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 81(252), pages 51-60, March.
  9. Matthew D. Henry & John L. Turner, 2010. "Patent Damages And Spatial Competition," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 279-305, June.
  10. Sen, Debapriya & Tauman, Yair, 2007. "General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 163-186, April.
  11. Tae-Yeoun Lee, 2001. "Effects of Technology Transfers on the Provision of Public Goods," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 18(2), pages 193-218, February.
  12. Arijit Mukherjee, 2002. "Licensing under Asymmetric information," Industrial Organization 0211007, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  13. Arijit Mukherjee, 2002. "R&D, Licensing and Patent Protection," Industrial Organization 0211011, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  14. Dyuti Banerjee & Sugata Marjit, 2009. "Trade and technology transfer in a vertically differentiated industry," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 98(1), pages 67-75, September.
  15. Marjit, Sugata & Beladi, Hamid, 1999. "Technology adoption and LDC firms," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(4), pages 421-429, December.
  16. Arijit Mukherjee, 2002. "Capacity Commitment and Licensing," Keele Economics Research Papers KERP 2002/05, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University.
  17. John Stranlund, 1996. "On the strategic potential of technological aid in international environmental relations," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 64(1), pages 1-22, February.
  18. Mukherjee, Arijit, 2003. "Does society prefer small innovation?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 78(3), pages 301-307, March.
  19. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2007:i:3:p:1-6 is not listed on IDEAS
  20. Ghosh, Arghya & Saha, Souresh, 2015. "Price competition, technology licensing and strategic trade policy," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 91-99.
  21. Sen, Debapriya & Stamatopoulos, Giorgos, 2009. "Drastic innovations and multiplicity of optimal licensing policies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(1), pages 7-10, October.
  22. Toshihiro Matsumura & Noriaki Matsushima & Giorgos Stamatopoulos, 2010. "Location equilibrium with asymmetric firms: the role of licensing," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 99(3), pages 267-276, April.
  23. Ramani, Shyama V., 2000. "Technology cooperation between firms of developed and less-developed countries," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 203-209, August.
  24. Kitagawa, Tatsuya & Masuda, Yasushi & Umezawa, Masashi, 2014. "Patent strength and optimal two-part tariff licensing with a potential rival," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 123(2), pages 227-231.
  25. Kabiraj, Tarun & Marjit, Sugata, 2003. "Protecting consumers through protection: The role of tariff-induced technology transfer," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 113-124, February.
  26. Acharyya, Rajat & Marjit, Sugata, 1998. "To Liberalize or Not to Liberalize an LDC-Market with an Inefficient Incumbent," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 277-296.
  27. Arijit Mukherjee & Yingyi Tsai, 2013. "Technology licensing under optimal tax policy," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 108(3), pages 231-247, April.
  28. Mukhopadhyay, Sankar & Kabiraj, Tarun & Mukherjee, Arijit, 1999. "Technology transfer in duopoly The role of cost asymmetry," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 363-374, November.
  29. Wang, X. Henry, 1998. "Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 55-62, July.
  30. Corchón, Luis C. & García, Clara Eugenia, 2005. "Technology transfer in oligopolistic markets with heterogeneous goods," UC3M Working papers. Economics we057036, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
  31. Li, Changying & Geng, Xiaoyan, 2008. "Licensing to a durable-good monopoly," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 876-884, September.
  32. Kabiraj, Abhishek & Kabiraj, Tarun, 2017. "Tariff induced licensing contracts, consumers’ surplus and welfare," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 439-447.
  33. Sen, Neelanjan & Minocha, Priyansh & Dutta, Arghya, 2022. "Technology licensing and Collusion," MPRA Paper 111639, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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