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Licensing under Asymmetric information

  • Arijit Mukherjee

    (Keele University)

In a world with private information about the quality of technology we find that there are situations where relatively more technologically superior firm will license its technology but relatively less technologically superior firm will not license its technology. This finding is opposite to the result found on licensing under complete information. Further, we show that under incomplete information welfare could be higher than under complete information.

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File URL: http://econwpa.repec.org/eps/io/papers/0211/0211007.pdf
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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Industrial Organization with number 0211007.

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Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: 05 Nov 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0211007
Note: Type of Document - pdf; prepared on pc; pages: 18
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://econwpa.repec.org

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  1. Beggs, A. W., 1992. "The licensing of patents under asymmetric information," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 171-191, June.
  2. Arijit Mukherjee, 2001. "Technology transfer with commitment," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 345-369.
  3. Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 181-214, Fall.
  4. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information," MPRA Paper 12532, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Rockett, Katharine, 1990. "The quality of licensed technology," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 559-574, December.
  6. Sougata Poddar & Uday Bhanu Sinha, 2002. "The Role of Fixed Fee and Royalty in Patent Licensing," Departmental Working Papers wp0211, National University of Singapore, Department of Economics.
  7. Marjit, Sugata, 1990. "On a non-cooperative theory of technology transfer," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 293-298, July.
  8. Nancy T. Gallini & Brian D. Wright, 1990. "Technology Transfer under Asymmetric Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 147-160, Spring.
  9. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 177-189, September.
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