Licensing under Asymmetric information
In a world with private information about the quality of technology we find that there are situations where relatively more technologically superior firm will license its technology but relatively less technologically superior firm will not license its technology. This finding is opposite to the result found on licensing under complete information. Further, we show that under incomplete information welfare could be higher than under complete information.
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