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Attention Management

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Lipnowski, Elliot & Mathevet, Laurent & Wei, Dong, 2022. "Optimal attention management: A tractable framework," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 170-180.
  2. Pietro Dall’Ara, 2025. "Persuading an Inattentive and Privately Informed Receiver," CSEF Working Papers 766, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  3. Pavel Ilinov & Andrei Matveenko & Maxim Senkov & Egor Starkov, 2022. "Optimally Biased Expertise," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp736, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
  4. Kepp, Kaido & Männasoo, Kadri, 2025. "Explaining switching behavior: Consumer attention and choice in car insurance market," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 238(C).
  5. Terstiege, Stefan & Wasser, Cédric, 2020. "Buyer-optimal extensionproof information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
  6. Ramachandran, Lakshmi Shankar & Tayal, Jitendra, 2021. "Mispricing, short-sale constraints, and the cross-section of option returns," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 141(1), pages 297-321.
  7. Vasudha Jain & Mark Whitmeyer, 2019. "Competing to Persuade a Rationally Inattentive Agent," Papers 1907.09255, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2020.
  8. Kim, Kyungmin & Koh, Youngwoo, 2022. "Auctions with flexible information acquisition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 256-281.
  9. Henrique de Oliveira & Jeffrey Mensch, 2025. "Posterior-Separable Costs and Menu Preferences," Papers 2511.09424, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2026.
  10. repec:upd:utmpwp:039 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. Jiwoong Shin & Chi-Ying Wang, 2024. "The Role of Messenger in Advertising Content: Bayesian Persuasion Perspective," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 43(4), pages 840-862, July.
  12. Jeffrey Mensch & Doron Ravid, 2022. "Monopoly, Product Quality, and Flexible Learning," Papers 2202.09985, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2025.
  13. Emir Kamenica & Kyungmin Kim & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2021. "Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 701-704, October.
  14. Matysková, Ludmila & Montes, Alfonso, 2023. "Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
  15. Xu, Shuo, 2025. "Persuasion through information cost design," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 153(C).
  16. Alex Bloedel & Tommaso Denti & Luciano Pomatto, 2025. "Modeling information acquisition via f-divergence and duality," Papers 2510.03482, arXiv.org.
  17. Wei, Dong, 2021. "Persuasion under costly learning," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
  18. Tsakas, Elias & Tsakas, Nikolas, 2021. "Noisy persuasion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 44-61.
  19. Takashi Ui, 2022. "Impacts of Public Information on Flexible Information Acquisition," Papers 2204.09250, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2022.
  20. Matveenko, Andrei & Mikhalishchev, Sergei, 2021. "Attentional role of quota implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
  21. Sergey Kovbasyuk & Marco Pagano, 2022. "Advertising Arbitrage [Synchronization risk and delayed arbitrage]," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 26(4), pages 799-827.
  22. Xiaoyu Cheng, 2020. "Ambiguous Persuasion: An Ex-Ante Formulation," Papers 2010.05376, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2025.
  23. Beg, Sabrin & Islam, Mahnaz & Rahman, Khandker Wahedur, 2024. "Information and behavior: Evidence from fertilizer quantity recommendations in Bangladesh," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 166(C).
  24. Dominik Naeher, 2023. "The Social Planning Problem with Costly Information Processing: Towards Understanding Production Decisions in Centralized Economies," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 90(357), pages 285-314, January.
  25. Bartosz Maćkowiak & Filip Matějka & Mirko Wiederholt, 2023. "Rational Inattention: A Review," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 61(1), pages 226-273, March.
  26. Hobler, Stephan, 2022. "Multi-layered rational inattention and time-varying volatility," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).
  27. Itai Arieli & Yakov Babichenko & Fedor Sandomirskiy, 2022. "Bayesian Persuasion with Mediators," Papers 2203.04285, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2022.
  28. Wu, Wenhao, 2023. "A geometric Blackwell’s order," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
  29. David Almog & Daniel Martin, 2024. "Rational inattention in games: experimental evidence," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 27(4), pages 715-742, September.
  30. Takashi Ui, 2022. "Optimal and Robust Disclosure of Public Information," Papers 2203.16809, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2022.
  31. Meng, Delong & Wang, Siyu, 2024. "Impact of open-mindedness on information avoidance: Tailored vs. generic communication," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 108(C).
  32. Yunfei (Jesse) Yao, 2024. "Dynamic Persuasion and Strategic Search," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 70(10), pages 6778-6803, October.
  33. Salil Sharma & Elias Tsakas & Mark Voorneveld, 2025. "Procuring Unverifiable Information," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 50(2), pages 1433-1453, May.
  34. Pietro Dall'Ara, 2024. "Persuading an inattentive and privately informed receiver," Papers 2408.01250, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2026.
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