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Persuading an Inattentive and Privately Informed Receiver

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Abstract

This paper studies the persuasion of a receiver who accesses information only if she exerts costly attention effort. A sender designs an experiment to persuade the receiver to take a specific action. The experiment affects the receiver’s attention effort, that is, the probability that she updates her beliefs. As an implication, persuasion has two margins: extensive (effort) and intensive (action). The receiver’s utility exhibits a supermodularity property in information and effort. By leveraging this property, we establish a general equivalence between experiments and persuasion mechanisms à la Kolotilin et al. (2017). In applications, the sender’s optimal strategy involves censoring favorable states.

Suggested Citation

  • Pietro Dall'Ara, 2025. "Persuading an Inattentive and Privately Informed Receiver," CSEF Working Papers 766, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    • Handle: RePEc:sef:csefwp:766
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Luciano Pomatto & Philipp Strack & Omer Tamuz, 2018. "The Cost of Information: The Case of Constant Marginal Costs," Papers 1812.04211, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2023.
    2. Luciano Pomatto & Philipp Strack & Omer Tamuz, 2023. "The Cost of Information: The Case of Constant Marginal Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 113(5), pages 1360-1393, May.
    3. Elliot Lipnowski & Laurent Mathevet & Dong Wei, 2020. "Attention Management," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 17-32, March.
    4. Pak Hung Au & Mark Whitmeyer, 2023. "Attraction versus Persuasion: Information Provision in Search Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(1), pages 202-245.
    5. Matthew Gentzkow & Emir Kamenica, 2016. "A Rothschild-Stiglitz Approach to Bayesian Persuasion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(5), pages 597-601, May.
    6. Beauchêne, Dorian & Li, Jian & Li, Ming, 2019. "Ambiguous persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 312-365.
    7. Piotr Dworczak & Alessandro Pavan, 2022. "Preparing for the Worst but Hoping for the Best: Robust (Bayesian) Persuasion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(5), pages 2017-2051, September.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making

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