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Citations for "A Market Equilibrium Theory of Job Assignment and Sequential Accumulation of Information"

by MacDonald, Glenn M

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  1. Jin, Xin, 2014. "The Signaling Role of Note Being Promoted: Theory and Evidence," MPRA Paper 58484, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Gibbons, Robert & Katz, Lawrence F, 1991. "Layoffs and Lemons," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 9(4), pages 351-80, October.
  3. Gibbons, Robert & Murphy, Kevin J, 1992. "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 468-505, June.
  4. Robert Gibbons & Michael Waldman, 1998. "A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics in Internal Labor Markets," NBER Working Papers 6454, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Robert Gibbons & Lawrence F. Katz & Thomas Lemieux & Daniel Parent, 2002. "Comparative Advantage, Learning, and Sectoral Wage Determination," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-35, CIRANO.
  6. Oyer, Paul, 2007. "Ability and Employer Learning: Evidence from the Economist Labor Market," Research Papers 1961, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  7. Charles T. Carlstrom, 1987. "Turnover wages and adverse selection," Working Paper 8717, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  8. Judith Chevalier & Glenn Ellison, 1999. "Career Concerns Of Mutual Fund Managers," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(2), pages 389-432, May.
  9. Leonardo Martinez, 2009. "Reputation, career concerns, and job assignments," Working Paper 06-01, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  10. Dupuy, Arnaud & Borghans, Lex, 2003. "Supply and Demand, Allocation and Wage Inequality: An International Comparison," IZA Discussion Papers 907, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  11. Akiko Maruyama, 2013. "Learning about oneĀ’'s own type: a search model with two-sided uncertainty," GRIPS Discussion Papers 12-24, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies.
  12. Michael Waldman, 1990. "A Signalling Explanation for Seniority Based Promotions and Other Labor Market Puzzles," UCLA Economics Working Papers 599, UCLA Department of Economics.
  13. Xin Jin, 2014. "The Signaling Role of Not Being Promoted: Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 0314, University of South Florida, Department of Economics.
  14. Farber, Henry S & Gibbons, Robert, 1996. "Learning and Wage Dynamics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(4), pages 1007-47, November.
  15. Orn B. Bodvarsson, 1987. "Monitoring with No Moral Hazard: The Case of Small Vessel Commercial Fishing," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 421-434, Oct-Dec.
  16. Michael Waldman, 1989. "Up-or-Out Contracts: A Signaling Perspective," UCLA Economics Working Papers 556, UCLA Department of Economics.
  17. Maitreesh Ghatak & Alexander Karaivanov, 2011. "Contractual Structure and Endogenous Matching in Partnershipso," STICERD - Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers Series 024, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  18. Matthew J. Clayton & Jay C. Hartzell & Joshua V. Rosenberg, 2003. "The impact of CEO turnover on equity volatility," Staff Reports 166, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  19. Robert Gibbons, 1996. "Incentives and Careers in Organizations," NBER Working Papers 5705, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  20. Andrew Foerster & Leonardo Martinez, 2006. "Are we working too hard or should we be working harder? A simple model of career concerns," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 79-91.
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