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Citations for "A Market Equilibrium Theory of Job Assignment and Sequential Accumulation of Information"

by MacDonald, Glenn M

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  1. Waldman, Michael, 1990. "Up-or-Out Contracts: A Signaling Perspective," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 8(2), pages 230-50, April.
  2. Dupuy, Arnaud & Borghans, Lex, 2003. "Supply and Demand, Allocation and Wage Inequality: An International Comparison," IZA Discussion Papers 907, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  3. Martinez Leonardo, 2009. "Reputation, Career Concerns, and Job Assignments," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-29, May.
  4. Ghatak, Maitreesh & Karaivanov, Alexander, 2011. "Contractual Structure and Endogenous Matching in Partnerships," CEPR Discussion Papers 8298, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Robert Gibbons & Lawrence F. Katz & Thomas Lemieux & Daniel Parent, 2002. "Comparative Advantage, Learning, and Sectoral Wage Determination," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-35, CIRANO.
  6. Henry S. Farber & Robert Gibbons, 1991. "Learning and Wage Dynamics," NBER Working Papers 3764, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Charles T. Carlstrom, 1989. "Turnover, wages, and adverse selection," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Q I, pages 18-28.
  8. Matthew J. Clayton & Jay C. Hartzell & Joshua V. Rosenberg, 2003. "The impact of CEO turnover on equity volatility," Staff Reports 166, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  9. Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 1991. "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 3792, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Xin Jin, 2014. "The Signaling Role of Not Being Promoted: Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 0314, University of South Florida, Department of Economics.
  11. Orn B. Bodvarsson, 1987. "Monitoring with No Moral Hazard: The Case of Small Vessel Commercial Fishing," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 421-434, Oct-Dec.
  12. Oyer, Paul, 2008. "Ability and employer learning: Evidence from the economist labor market," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 268-289, June.
  13. Andrew Foerster & Leonardo Martinez, 2006. "Are we working too hard or should we be working harder? A simple model of career concerns," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 79-91.
  14. Michael Waldman, 1990. "A Signalling Explanation for Seniority Based Promotions and Other Labor Market Puzzles," UCLA Economics Working Papers 599, UCLA Department of Economics.
  15. Akiko Maruyama, 2013. "Learning about oneĀ’'s own type: a search model with two-sided uncertainty," GRIPS Discussion Papers 12-24, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies.
  16. Jin, Xin, 2014. "The Signaling Role of Note Being Promoted: Theory and Evidence," MPRA Paper 58484, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  17. Robert Gibbons & Michael Waldman, 1998. "A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics in Internal Labor Markets," NBER Working Papers 6454, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  18. Judith Chevalier & Glenn Ellison, 1998. "Career Concerns of Mutual Fund Managers," NBER Working Papers 6394, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  19. Gibbons, R. & Katz, L.F., 1989. "Layoffs And Lemons," Working papers 531, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  20. Robert Gibbons, 1996. "Incentives and Careers in Organizations," NBER Working Papers 5705, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  21. Daniel Ferreira & Radoslawa Nikolowa, 2015. "Misallocation of Talent in Competitive Labor Markets," Working Papers 740, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.