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Citations for "A Market Equilibrium Theory of Job Assignment and Sequential Accumulation of Information"

by MacDonald, Glenn M

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  1. Leonardo Martinez, 2009. "Reputation, career concerns, and job assignments," Working Paper 06-01, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  2. Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 1991. "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 3792, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Robert Gibbons & Lawrence F. Katz & Thomas Lemieux & Daniel Parent, 2002. "Comparative Advantage, Learning, and Sectoral Wage Determination," NBER Working Papers 8889, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Gibbons, Robert & Katz, Lawrence F, 1991. "Layoffs and Lemons," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 9(4), pages 351-80, October.
  5. Judith Chevalier & Glenn Ellison, 1999. "Career Concerns Of Mutual Fund Managers," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(2), pages 389-432, May.
  6. Ghatak, Maitreesh & Karaivanov, Alexander, 2011. "Contractual Structure and Endogenous Matching in Partnerships," CEPR Discussion Papers 8298, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Oyer, Paul, 2008. "Ability and employer learning: Evidence from the economist labor market," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 268-289, June.
  8. Michael Waldman, 1989. "Up-or-Out Contracts: A Signaling Perspective," UCLA Economics Working Papers 556, UCLA Department of Economics.
  9. Jin, Xin, 2014. "The Signaling Role of Note Being Promoted: Theory and Evidence," MPRA Paper 58484, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. Dupuy,Arnaud & Borghans,Lex, 2003. "Supply and Demand, Allocation and Wage Inequality: An International Comparison," ROA Research Memorandum 009, Maastricht University, Research Centre for Education and the Labour Market (ROA).
  11. Xin Jin, 2014. "The Signaling Role of Not Being Promoted: Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 0314, University of South Florida, Department of Economics.
  12. Matthew J. Clayton & Jay C. Hartzell & Joshua V. Rosenberg, 2003. "The impact of CEO turnover on equity volatility," Staff Reports 166, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  13. Orn B. Bodvarsson, 1987. "Monitoring with No Moral Hazard: The Case of Small Vessel Commercial Fishing," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 421-434, Oct-Dec.
  14. Michael Waldman, 1990. "A Signalling Explanation for Seniority Based Promotions and Other Labor Market Puzzles," UCLA Economics Working Papers 599, UCLA Department of Economics.
  15. Robert Gibbons & Lawrence F. Katz & Thomas Lemieux & Daniel Parent, 2002. "Comparative Advantage, Learning, and Sectoral Wage Determination," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-35, CIRANO.
  16. Akiko Maruyama, 2013. "Learning about oneĀ’'s own type: a search model with two-sided uncertainty," GRIPS Discussion Papers 12-24, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies.
  17. Charles T. Carlstrom, 1987. "Turnover wages and adverse selection," Working Paper 8717, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  18. Andrew Foerster & Leonardo Martinez, 2006. "Are we working too hard or should we be working harder? A simple model of career concerns," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 79-91.
  19. Farber, Henry S & Gibbons, Robert, 1996. "Learning and Wage Dynamics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(4), pages 1007-47, November.
  20. Robert Gibbons, 1996. "Incentives and Careers in Organizations," NBER Working Papers 5705, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  21. Robert Gibbons & Michael Waldman, 1998. "A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics in Internal Labor Markets," NBER Working Papers 6454, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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