A Learning Theory for the Harsanyi's Doctrine in Repeated Games
This paper investigates simultaneous learning about both nature and others' actions in repeated games, and identifies a set of sufficient conditions assuring that equilibrium actions converge to a Nash equilibrium. Players have each an utility function over infinite histories continuous for the product topology. Nature' drawing after any history can depend on any past actions, or can be independent of them. Provided that 1) every player maximizes her expected payoff against her own beliefs, 2) every player updates her beliefs in a Bayesian manner, 3) prior beliefs about both nature and other players' strategies have a grain of truth, and 4) beliefs about nature are independent of actions chosen during the game, we show that after some finite time the equilibrium outcome of the above game is arbitrarily close to a Nash equilibrium. Those assumptions are shown to be tight.
|Date of creation:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Schönberggasse 1, CH-8001 Zürich|
Phone: +41-1-634 21 37
Fax: +41-1-634 49 82
Web page: http://www.econ.uzh.ch/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ehud Kalai & Ehud Lehrer, 1990.
"Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium,"
895, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Ehud Kalai & Ehud Lehrer, 1990. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Discussion Papers 925, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- E. Kalai & E. Lehrer, 2010. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 529, David K. Levine.
- Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1991. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Working Papers 91-18, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1991.
"Self-Confirming Equilibrium ,"
581, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- John C Harsanyi, 1997. "Games with incomplete information played by "bayesian" players," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1175, David K. Levine.
- Jordan, J. S., 1991. "Bayesian learning in normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 60-81, February.
- Sandroni, Alvaro, 1998. "Does Rational Learning Lead to Nash Equilibrium in Finitely Repeated Games?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 195-218, January.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zur:iewwpx:196. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marita Kieser)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.