Divided boards: Partisanship through delegated monetary policy
While monetary policy decisions are mainly taken by Committees (as is the case for the ECB, or for the Federal Reserve), the literature largely stands on the …ction of a single central banker, be it (or not) a conservative one. The purpose here is to consider explicitly the plural dimension of monetary policy Boards, and to investigate the consequences of such a decision structure for monetary policy rules.
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