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Entflechtung von Stromnetzen in Deutschland und Europa im Rahmen des dritten EU-Legislativpakets: Eine Problemdarstellung

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  • Büdenbender, Martin

Abstract

Der Liberalisierungsprozess der Märkte für Elektrizität, wichtiger Netzsektoren, hat vor Jahren begonnen und sich mit unterschiedlichen Geschwindigkeiten fortgesetzt. Nicht nur das Zusammenwirken europäischer und nationaler Regulierungsaktivitäten enthält interessante Fragestellungen für Ökonomen, sondern ebenso die Interdependenzen zwischen einzelnen Regulierungselementen. Dies betrifft etwa die Verbindungslinien zwischen der Marktverhaltens- und der Marktstruktur-Regulierung auf dem Strommarkt. Aktuell steht eine Intensivierung des Unbundling-Regimes auf der regulierungspolitischen Agenda, die bereits im Vorfeld zu intensiven theoretischen und politischen Diskussionen geführt hat. Die Regierungen der EU-Mitgliedsländer sind nun gefordert, sich für eine von drei möglichen Ausgestaltungen des Entflechtungsregimes zu entscheiden. Nicht nur ökonomische, sondern auch regulierungs- und parteipolitische Determinanten werden das Ergebnis beeinflussen, das weitreichende Konsequenzen für die Verfügungsrechte der Elektrizitätsunternehmen und die Organisation der Strom Wertschöpfungskette haben wird. Im vorliegenden IfG-Arbeitspapier skizziert Martin Büdenbender die technischen, die organisatorischen und die regulatorischen Aspekte des Strommarktes in Deutschland. Vor diesem Hintergrund vergleicht er die Inhalte sowie die Konsequenzen der drei möglichen Entflechtungskonzepte und bezieht zusätzlich die politischen Rahmenbedingungen der Entscheidungsfindung ein. Dieses Arbeitspapier stammt aus dem IfG-Forschungscluster I: Institutionenökonomische Analysen.

Suggested Citation

  • Büdenbender, Martin, 2009. "Entflechtung von Stromnetzen in Deutschland und Europa im Rahmen des dritten EU-Legislativpakets: Eine Problemdarstellung," Arbeitspapiere 91, University of Münster, Institute for Cooperatives.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:wwuifg:91
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Gert Brunekreeft, 2008. "Ownership Unbundling in Electricity Markets – A Social Cost Benefit Analysis of the German TSOs," Working Papers EPRG 0816, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
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