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Using AI Persuasion to Reduce Political Polarization

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  • Walter, Johannes

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Walter, Johannes, 2025. "Using AI Persuasion to Reduce Political Polarization," VfS Annual Conference 2025 (Cologne): Revival of Industrial Policy 325453, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc25:325453
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    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/325453/1/vfs-2025-pid-129166.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alan Gerber & Daniel Kessler & Marc Meredith, 2008. "The Persuasive Effects of Direct Mail: A Regression Discontinuity Approach," NBER Working Papers 14206, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Emir Kamenica, 2019. "Bayesian Persuasion and Information Design," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 11(1), pages 249-272, August.
    3. Wladislaw Mill & John Morgan, 2022. "The cost of a divided America: an experimental study into destructive behavior," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(3), pages 974-1001, June.
    4. Arieli, Itai & Babichenko, Yakov, 2019. "Private Bayesian persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 182(C), pages 185-217.
    5. Fafchamps, Marcel & Islam, Asad & Pakrashi, Debayan & Tommasi, Denni, 2026. "Diffusion in social networks: Experimental evidence on information sharing vs persuasion," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 179(C).
    6. Joshua Schwartzstein & Adi Sunderam, 2021. "Using Models to Persuade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(1), pages 276-323, January.
    7. Emir Kamenica & Matthew Gentzkow, 2011. "Bayesian Persuasion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(6), pages 2590-2615, October.
    8. Ingar Haaland & Christopher Roth & Johannes Wohlfart, 2023. "Designing Information Provision Experiments," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 61(1), pages 3-40, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

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