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Are Sequential Round-Robin Tournaments Discriminatory?

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  • Sahm, Marco

Abstract

I examine sequential round-robin tournaments with three and four symmetric players which are matched once with each other. If the matches are organized as Tullock contests (all-pay auctions), the tournament is almost fair (highly discriminatory): Subject to the position of their matches in the sequence of the tournament, the differences in players’ ex ante winning probabilities and expected payoffs are small (large). Discrepancy results from a higher discriminating power of the all-pay auction.

Suggested Citation

  • Sahm, Marco, 2017. "Are Sequential Round-Robin Tournaments Discriminatory?," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168113, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168113
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Christoph Laica & Arne Lauber & Marco Sahm, 2017. "Sequential Round-Robin Tournaments with Multiple Prizes," CESifo Working Paper Series 6685, CESifo.
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    3. Martin Carolin & Westerhoff Frank, 2019. "Regulating Speculative Housing Markets via Public Housing Construction Programs: Insights from a Heterogeneous Agent Model," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 239(4), pages 627-660, August.
    4. Lustenhouwer, Joep & Mavromatis, Kostas, 2017. "Fiscal consolidations and finite planning horizons," BERG Working Paper Series 130, Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group.
    5. March, Christoph & Sahm, Marco, 2018. "Contests as selection mechanisms: The impact of risk aversion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 114-131.
    6. Hommes, Cars & Lustenhouwer, Joep, 2019. "Managing unanchored, heterogeneous expectations and liquidity traps," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 1-16.
    7. Hommes, Cars & Lustenhouwer, Joep & Mavromatis, Kostas, 2018. "Fiscal consolidations and heterogeneous expectations," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 173-205.
    8. Mundt, Philipp & Oh, Ilfan, 2019. "Asymmetric competition, risk, and return distribution," BERG Working Paper Series 145, Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • Z20 - Other Special Topics - - Sports Economics - - - General

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