Effort Maximization in Asymmetric N-Person Contest Games
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- Franke, Jörg & Kanzow, Christian & Leininger, Wolfgang & Väth, Alexandra, 2009. "Effort Maximization in Asymmetric N-person Contest Games," Ruhr Economic Papers 130, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
References listed on IDEAS
- Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2005. "Asymmetric contests with general technologies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(4), pages 923-946, November.
- Konrad, Kai A., 2009. "Strategy and Dynamics in Contests," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199549603.
- Alan Gelder & Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2016. "All-Pay Auctions with Ties," Working Papers 16-31, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Stein, William E, 2002. "Asymmetric Rent-Seeking with More Than Two Contestants," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 113(3-4), pages 325-336, December.
- Szidarovszky, Ferenc & Okuguchi, Koji, 1997. "On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure Nash Equilibrium in Rent-Seeking Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 135-140, January.
- Gradstein, Mark & Konrad, Kai A, 1999. "Orchestrating Rent Seeking Contests," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(458), pages 536-545, October.
- Dasgupta, Ani & Nti, Kofi O., 1998. "Designing an optimal contest," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 587-603, November.
- Nti, Kofi O., 2004. "Maximum efforts in contests with asymmetric valuations," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 1059-1066, November.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Jia, Hao & Skaperdas, Stergios & Vaidya, Samarth, 2013.
"Contest functions: Theoretical foundations and issues in estimation,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 211-222.
- Hao Jia & Stergios Skaperdas & Samarth Vaidya, 2012. "Contest Functions: Theoretical Foundations and Issues in Estimation," Working Papers 111214, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
- Beviá, Carmen & Corchón, Luis C., 2013. "Endogenous strength in conflicts," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 297-306.
- Todd Kaplan & David Wettstein, 2015.
"The optimal design of rewards in contests,"
Review of Economic Design,
Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 19(4), pages 327-339, December.
- Kaplan, Todd & Wettstein, David, "undated". "The Optimal Design of Rewards in Contests," Working Papers WP2010/6, University of Haifa, Department of Economics, revised 22 Nov 2010.
- Kaplan, Todd R & Wettstein, David, 2010. "The optimal design of rewards in contests," MPRA Paper 27397, University Library of Munich, Germany.
More about this item
Keywordseffort maximization; existence of solution; asymmetric contests; participation constraints;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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