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Environmental Taxation and Redistribution Concerns

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  • Aigner, Rafael

Abstract

How is the optimal level of Pigouvian taxation influenced by distributive concerns? With second-best instruments, a higher level of income redistribution calls for a lower level of Pigouvian taxation. More redistribution implies higher distortions from income taxation. Pigouvian tax revenues become more valuable and the optimal level of environmental taxation decreases. With first-best in- struments, however, the relation between levels of redistribution and Pigouvian taxation is reversed. So second-best Pigouvian taxes are very different from their first-best counterpart - despite apparently identical first order conditions.

Suggested Citation

  • Aigner, Rafael, 2013. "Environmental Taxation and Redistribution Concerns," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79859, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79859
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Alberto Gago & Xavier Labandeira & Xiral López Otero, 2014. "A Panorama on Energy Taxes and Green Tax Reforms," Hacienda Pública Española, IEF, vol. 208(1), pages 145-190, March.
    2. Bas Jacobs & Rick van der Ploeg, 2017. "Should Pollution Taxes be Targeted at Income Redistribution?," CESifo Working Paper Series 6599, CESifo Group Munich.
    3. Klenert, David & Mattauch, Linus & Combet, Emmanuel & Edenhofer, Ottmar & Hepburn, Cameron & Rafaty, Ryan & Stern, Nicholas, 2017. "Making Carbon Pricing Work," MPRA Paper 80943, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Rafael Aigner, 2014. "Environmental Taxation and Redistribution Concerns," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 70(2), pages 249-277, June.
    5. Alessandro Balestrino, 2014. "Large Taxes, Status Goods, and Piracy," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 70(1), pages 97-115, March.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities

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