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Recursivity and Self-Referentiality of Economic Theories and Their Implications for Bounded Rational Actors

  • Lehmann-Waffenschmidt, Marco
  • Sandri, Serena
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    This study aims at the analysis of the possible self-referential effects of economic theories and models on its own subject and of the mechanisms through which bounded rational actors perceive the self-referential nature of economic theories and might absorb their prescriptions. Thus, the focus of the present study will be on the effects of economic theories on the behaviour of the analyzed economic actors. The analysis of the possible causal role of theories on bounded rational economic behaviour will be interpreted as a sort of validity test of economic theory.

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    Paper provided by Dresden University of Technology, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics in its series Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics with number 03/07.

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    Date of creation: 2007
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:zbw:tuddps:0307
    Contact details of provider: Postal: 01062 Dresden
    Phone: ++49 351 463 2196
    Fax: ++49 351 463 7739
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    1. Emile Grunberg & Franco Modigliani, 1954. "The Predictability of Social Events," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62, pages 465.
    2. Berg Joyce & Dickhaut John & McCabe Kevin, 1995. "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 122-142, July.
    3. Tilman Slembeck, 2000. "Ideologies, Beliefs, and Economic Advice - A Cognitive- Evolutionary View on Economic Policy-Making," Public Economics 0004005, EconWPA.
    4. Arthur T. Denzau & Douglass C. North, 1993. "Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions," Economic History 9309003, EconWPA.
    5. Cass, David & Shell, Karl, 1983. "Do Sunspots Matter?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(2), pages 193-227, April.
    6. Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt, 2004. "Bounded Rationality and Theory Absorption," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2004-27, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
    7. Güth, Werner & Kliemt, Hartmut, 2001. "From full to bounded rationality: The limits of unlimited rationality," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 2001,12, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
    8. Morgenstern, Oskar, 1972. "Descriptive, Predictive and Normative Theory," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(4), pages 699-714.
    9. John Davis & Matthias Klaes, 2003. "Reflexivity: curse or cure?," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(3), pages 329-352.
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