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Regulatory Europeanization, national autonomy and regulatory effectiveness: Marketing authorization for pharmaceuticals


  • Feick, Jürgen


The EC harmonized market entry regulation for pharmaceuticals from the early sixties on, but it achieved neither its goal of uniform national regulatory decisions nor that of automatic mutual recognition. Subsequent attempts to Europeanize the procedures themselves resulted in two alternatives in 1995: a Centralized Procedure for innovative pharmaceutical products implemented at the EU level, and a Decentralized Procedure which tries to assure mutual recognition. First, the paper analyzes the distinctive modes of Europeanization employed in these regulatory alternatives, examining both their impact on the effectiveness of European governing and the balance they strike between European interventionism, national participation and national autonomy. Second, it tries to assess whether Europeanization furthers the goals of pharmaceutical market entry policy as defined in European regulations - public health protection, creation of a single market and the reduction of regulatory costs to industry. There is little evidence that the public's health is less well protected when regulation is Europeanized. Only the Centralized Procedure contributes significantly to the goal of establishing a single market. Regulatory costs in terms of approval time did go down especially for pharmaceutical firms using the Centralized Procedure, mainly because of efficiency-enhancing legal provisions and institutionally induced regulatory competition between national authorities.

Suggested Citation

  • Feick, Jürgen, 2002. "Regulatory Europeanization, national autonomy and regulatory effectiveness: Marketing authorization for pharmaceuticals," MPIfG Discussion Paper 02/6, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:mpifgd:p0027

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph, 1996. "Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 403-442, November.
    2. Potters, Jan & Van Winden, Frans, 1990. "Modelling political pressure as transmission of information," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 61-88, August.
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