IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/itsp11/52339.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Regulation and media monopoly: A case study of broadcast regulation in Pakistan

Author

Listed:
  • Rasul, Azmat
  • McDowell, Stephen D.

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Rasul, Azmat & McDowell, Stephen D., 2011. "Regulation and media monopoly: A case study of broadcast regulation in Pakistan," 8th ITS Asia-Pacific Regional Conference, Taipei 2011: Convergence in the Digital Age 52339, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:itsp11:52339
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/52339/1/673080374.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    2. A. R. Kemal, 2002. "Regulatory Framework in Pakistan," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 41(4), pages 319-332.
    3. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Georges Dionne, 2003. "The Foundationsof Banks' Risk Regulation: A Review of Literature," THEMA Working Papers 2003-46, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    2. Nancy L. Rose, 2014. "Learning from the Past: Insights for the Regulation of Economic Activity," NBER Chapters, in: Economic Regulation and Its Reform: What Have We Learned?, pages 1-23, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Miguel Boucinha & Carlo Altavilla & Frank Smets & José-Luis Peydró, 2019. "Banking Supervision, Monetary Policy and Risk-Taking: Big Data Evidence from 15 Credit Registers," Working Papers 1137, Barcelona School of Economics.
    4. Moszoro, Marian W. & Spiller, Pablo T., 2014. "Third-Party Opportunism and the Theory of Public Contracts: Operationalization and Applications," MPRA Paper 101592, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 2003. "Elected Versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(5), pages 1176-1206, September.
    6. De Chiara, Alessandro & Livio, Luca & Ponce, Jorge, 2018. "Flexible and mandatory banking supervision," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 86-104.
    7. Camille Chaserant & Sophie Harnay, 2013. "The regulation of quality in the market for legal services: Taking the heterogeneity of legal services seriously," European Journal of Comparative Economics, Cattaneo University (LIUC), vol. 10(2), pages 267-291, August.
    8. Besley, Timothy & Malcomson, James M., 2018. "Competition in public service provision: The role of not-for-profit providers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 158-172.
    9. Shilin Zheng & Xinzhu Zhang, 2013. "The effect of the Chinese telecommunications reform on industrial growth: 1994–2007," Chapters, in: Michael Faure & Xinzhu Zhang (ed.), The Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law, chapter 7, pages 233-261, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    10. Trenton G. Smith & Attila Tasnádi, 2014. "The Economics of Information, Deep Capture, and the Obesity Debate," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 96(2), pages 533-541.
    11. Essi Eerola, 2004. "Forest Conservation – Too Much or Too Little? A Political Economy Model," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 27(4), pages 391-407, April.
    12. Moszoro Marian W., 2016. "Coasean Quality of Regulated Goods," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(4), pages 1-13, October.
    13. Rafael Tella & Juan Dubra, 2014. "Anger and Regulation," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 116(3), pages 734-765, July.
    14. Felix Höffler & Sebastian Kranz, 2015. "Using Forward Contracts to Reduce Regulatory Capture," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(4), pages 598-624, December.
    15. Pontus Braunerhjelm & Magnus Henrekson, 2016. "An Innovation Policy Framework: Bridging the Gap Between Industrial Dynamics and Growth," International Studies in Entrepreneurship, in: David B. Audretsch & Albert N. Link (ed.), Essays in Public Sector Entrepreneurship, edition 1, chapter 0, pages 95-130, Springer.
    16. Christian Jaag & Urs Trinkner, 2011. "A General Framework for Regulation and Liberalization in Network Industries," Chapters, in: Matthias Finger & Rolf W. Künneke (ed.), International Handbook of Network Industries, chapter 3, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    17. Matthias Dahm & Nicolás Porteiro, 2008. "Informational lobbying under the shadow of political pressure," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(4), pages 531-559, May.
    18. Berg, Sanford V. & Jiang, Liangliang & Lin, Chen, 2012. "Regulation and corporate corruption: New evidence from the telecom sector," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 22-43.
    19. Rodrigo M. S. Moita & Claudio Paiva, 2013. "Political Price Cycles in Regulated Industries: Theory and Evidence," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 94-121, February.
    20. Abbassi, Puriya & Iyer, Rajkamal & Peydró, José-Luis & Soto, Paul, 2020. "Stressed Banks? Evidence from the Largest-Ever Supervisory Review," EconStor Preprints 217048, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:itsp11:52339. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.itsworld.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.