Ex-ante margin squeeze tests in the telecommunications industry: What is a reasonably efficient operator? (Revised: September 6, 2012)
In this paper, we study the adjustments made by National Regulatory Authorities to simple margin squeeze tests, in order to model a reasonably efficient operator. More precisely, by inspecting the possible differences between an entrant and an incumbent that would cause a market disadvantage for the former, we provide a formal economic framework that translates these ex-ante disadvantages into practical test adjustments. We identify five possible adjustments relevant to ex-ante margin squeeze tests, on the cost, the access charge, or the price parameters. We then review the implementation of margin squeeze tests by European telecommunications National Regulatory Authorities according to these adjustments, as to build a comparable benchmark of implementation choices.
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|Date of creation:||2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.itseurope.org/ |
References listed on IDEAS
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- Henry ERGAS & Eric RALPH & Emma LANIGAN, 2010. "Price Squeezes and Imputation Tests on Next Generation Access Networks," Communications & Strategies, IDATE, Com&Strat dept., vol. 1(78), pages 67-86, 2nd quart.
- Bouckaert, Jan & Verboven, Frank, 2003.
"Price Squeezes in a Regulatory Environment,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3824, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 1998.
"The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries,"
NBER Working Papers
6831, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 2002. "The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(2), pages 194-220, Summer.
- Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 1998. "The Strategic Use Of Tying To Preserve And Create Market Power In Evolving Industries," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 145, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
- Briglauer, Wolfgang & Vogelsang, Ingo, 2011. "The need for a new approach to regulating fixed networks," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 102-114, March.
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