Exclusionary Bundling and the Effects of a Competitive Fringe
The traditional analysis of exclusionary bundling examines the impact of a monopolist bundling product A with another product B, which is competitively provided. Using experimental posted-offer markets, we investigate the exclusionary and welfare implications of having a fringe competitor in the A market. We find that the fringe seller increases the consumer surplus while decreasing the seller surplus and that the fringe seller does not affect the consumer surplus extracted from the bundle despite a decrease in the bundle transaction price. The consumer surplus gains generated by the fringe seller erode if the dominant seller has a lower average cost.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 163 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.mohr.de/jite |
|Order Information:|| Postal: Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200703)163:1_109:ebateo_2.0.tx_2-r. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Wolpert)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.