Exclusionary Bundling and the Effects of a Competitive Fringe
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- Hinloopen, Jeroen & Müller, Wieland & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2014.
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- Christoph Engel & Urs Schweizer, 2007. "Editorial Preface," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 163(1), pages 1-4, March.
- Paul Heidhues, 2007. "Exclusionary Bundling and the Effects of a Competitive Fringe. Comment," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 163(1), pages 138-142, March.
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More about this item
- C99 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Other
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
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