Competition between clearing houses on the European market
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- Marie-Noëlle Calès & Laurent Granier & Nadège Marchand, 2012. "Competition between Clearing Houses on the European Market," Post-Print halshs-00959121, HAL.
- Marie-Noëlle Calès & Laurent Granier & Nadège Marchand, 2016. "Competition between Clearing Houses on the European Market," Post-Print halshs-01418208, HAL.
- Marie-Noëlle Calès & Laurent Granier & Nadège Marchand, 2014. "Competition between Clearing Houses on the European Market," Post-Print halshs-00959119, HAL.
- Marie-Noëlle Calès & Laurent Granier & Nadège Marchand, 2016. "Competition between Clearing Houses on the European Market," Post-Print halshs-01418204, HAL.
- Marie-Noëlle Calès & Laurent Granier & Nadège Marchand, 2015. "Competition between clearing houses on the European market," Working Papers halshs-00690901, HAL.
- Marie-Noëlle Calès & Laurent Granier & Nadège Marchand, 2013. "Competition between Clearing Houses on the European Market," Post-Print halshs-00878844, HAL.
- Marie-Noëlle Calès & Laurent Granier & Nadège Marchand, 2013. "Competition between Clearing Houses on the European Market," Post-Print halshs-00959120, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Li, Shaofang & Marinč, Matej, 2016. "Competition in the clearing and settlement industry," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 134-162.
- Krahnen, Jan Pieter & Pelizzon, Loriana, 2016. ""Predatory" margins and the regulation and supervision of central counterparty clearing houses (CCPs)," SAFE White Paper Series 41, Goethe University Frankfurt, Research Center SAFE - Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe.
More about this item
Keywords
bundling; clearing house; interoperability; merger; post-market organization;JEL classification:
- L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
- G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets
- G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ALL-2012-05-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2012-05-02 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2012-05-02 (Industrial Organization)
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