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Ex-ante margin squeeze tests in the telecommunications industry: What is a reasonable efficient operator? (Revised: December 20, 2012)

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Listed:
  • Gaudiny, Germain
  • Saavedra Valenzuela, Claudia

Abstract

We study the implementation of reasonably efficient operator margin squeeze tests by National Regulatory Authorities in European telecommunications markets. We provide a theoretical framework in which we show how regulatory authorities deal with the asymmetries between the entrants and the incumbent by adjusting the equally efficient operator margin squeeze test used in competition policy. Using this framework, we build a benchmark of implementation choices by inspecting authorities' guidelines, market analyses and decisions. We find that some implementation choices are very similar across the authorities' decisions, whereas some others are dealt with quite heterogeneously.

Suggested Citation

  • Gaudiny, Germain & Saavedra Valenzuela, Claudia, 2012. "Ex-ante margin squeeze tests in the telecommunications industry: What is a reasonable efficient operator? (Revised: December 20, 2012)," 23rd European Regional ITS Conference, Vienna 2012 67955, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:itse12:67955
    Note: Revised Version: December 20, 2012
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jan Bouckaert & Frank Verboven, 2004. "Price Squeezes in a Regulatory Environment," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 321-351, August.
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    3. David Spector, 2008. "Some Economics of Margin Squeeze," Post-Print halshs-00754307, HAL.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Margin squeeze; Imputation test; Regulation; Telecommunications;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications

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