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The inner structure of pyramid and capital structure: Evidence from China

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  • Su, Kun

Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between capital structure and the inner structure of pyramid in an emerging market economy country. The author uses firm-level panel data of Chinese listed companies to analyze the influence of the inner structure of pyramid on capital structure and the differences between different institutional environments of that influence deeply. His results show that the longer the layers of pyramid structure, the stronger the leverage effect of pyramid structure, as well as the ultimate controllers' motivation to expand debt financing will be. So the layers of pyramid structure have a significantly positive effect on capital structure. However, the chains of pyramid structure have no significant effects on capital structure. Compared with the areas with poor institutional environment, in the areas with better institutional environment, the effects of the layers of pyramid structure on corporate capital structure is relatively small.

Suggested Citation

  • Su, Kun, 2014. "The inner structure of pyramid and capital structure: Evidence from China," Economics Discussion Papers 2014-5, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:20145
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Godlewski, Christophe J., 2014. "The determinants of multiple bank loan renegotiations in Europe," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 275-286.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    pyramid structure; institutional environment; capital structure; agent chain;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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