Chance of revolts and ability of oppressions: a comment on the Acemoglu-Robinson model
In the original framework of Professors Acemoglu and Robinson, the government is unable to oppress the revolution once it is brought about. However, actual civil wars are unpredictable. With this notion, I introduce uncertainty depending on military expenditures of the government. Then an interesting argument follows: if the likelihood of successful oppression is sufficiently larger than a certain level of destruction rate and there are cheap-but-effective devices such as biochemicals, citizens in a dictatorial country may have a trade-off between economic prosperity and domestic military threats.
|Date of creation:||2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Kiellinie 66, D-24105 Kiel|
Phone: +49 431 8814-1
Fax: +49 431 8814528
Web page: http://www.economics-ejournal.org/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Aizenman, Joshua & Glick, Reuven, 2003.
"Military Expenditure, Threats, and Growth,"
Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series
qt41r4105h, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
- Joshua Aizenman & Reuven Glick, 2006. "Military expenditure, threats, and growth," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(2), pages 129-155.
- Aizenman, Joshua & Glick, Reuven, 2003. "Military Expenditure, Threats, and Growth," Santa Cruz Center for International Economics, Working Paper Series qt41r4105h, Center for International Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
- Joshua Aizenman & Reuven Glick, 2003. "Military expenditure, threats, and growth," Working Paper Series 2003-08, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
- Joshua Aizenman & Reuven Glick, 2003. "Military Expenditure, Threats, and Growth," NBER Working Papers 9618, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, 2007. "Unintended Consequences: Does Aid Promote Arms Races?," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 69(1), pages 1-27, 02.
- Acemoglu,Daron & Robinson,James A., 2009.
"Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521671422, November.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:20107. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.