IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/i4rdps/192.html

Response to Adjisse, Blimpo, and Castañeda Dower (2024)

Author

Listed:
  • Balán, Pablo
  • Bergeron, Augustin
  • Tourek, Gabriel
  • Weigel, Jonathan

Abstract

Adjisse, Blimpo, and Castañeda Dower (2024) reproduce the tables and figures of Balán et al. (2022) with the exception an incorrect sign on one coefficient in Table 5. Although not central to Balán et al. (2022), we are grateful to have discovered this error and have submitted a corrigendum to the AER accordingly. They then conduct three additional analyses. 1. They construct standard errors with randomization inference, which does not lead to qualitatively different results. 2. When comparing the main three treatment arms, they control for baseline trust in the chief. This covariate is Balánced for these three treatment arms, but imBalánced in a fourth treatment arm we do not study in the paper. This variable is also uncorrelated with the outcome and thus an unlikely source of omitted variable bias. By including this control, the authors restrict the analysis to the baseline survey sample, a sample size reduction of 91%, which not surprisingly increases the standard errors. In this sub-sample, the magnitude of the coefficient on one treatment indicator increases slightly, suggesting if anything stronger evidence of the informational mechanism proposed in the paper. Controlling for the average level of trust in the chief in the full sample leaves our results unchanged. 3. They examine a prediction exercise - one of four auxiliary descriptive analyses regarding the mechanism - in which we compare the properties visited by different types of tax collectors across treatment arms. They add 13 binary neighborhood-level variables to a regression predicting tax compliance at the household level. This unconventional prediction approach fits noise and worsens the prediction, introducing classical measurement error into the ultimate exercise. When we redo their check with LASSO, it drops all but two of these variables and replicates our results. Although we appreciate the interest in our paper, we question the statistical value of the latter two analyses.

Suggested Citation

  • Balán, Pablo & Bergeron, Augustin & Tourek, Gabriel & Weigel, Jonathan, 2024. "Response to Adjisse, Blimpo, and Castañeda Dower (2024)," I4R Discussion Paper Series 192, The Institute for Replication (I4R).
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:i4rdps:192
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/307932/1/I4R-DP192.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Adnan Q. Khan & Asim I. Khwaja & Benjamin A. Olken, 2016. "Tax Farming Redux: Experimental Evidence on Performance Pay for Tax Collectors," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 131(1), pages 219-271.
    2. Jonathan L Weigel, 2020. "The Participation Dividend of Taxation: How Citizens in Congo Engage More with the State When it Tries to Tax Them," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 135(4), pages 1849-1903.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. James A Robinson, 2023. "Tax Aversion and the Social Contract in Africa," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies, vol. 32(Supplemen), pages 33-56.
    2. Cohen, Isabelle, 2024. "Technology and the state: Building capacity to tax via text," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 236(C).
    3. Pablo Balán & Augustin Bergeron & Gabriel Tourek & Jonathan L. Weigel, 2022. "Local Elites as State Capacity: How City Chiefs Use Local Information to Increase Tax Compliance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(3), pages 762-797, March.
    4. Cao, Chunfang & Li, Xiaoyang & Xia, Changyuan, 2021. "The complicit role of local government authorities in corporate bribery: Evidence from a tax collection reform in China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    5. Yahagi, Ken, 2021. "Law enforcement with motivated agents," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    6. repec:idq:ictduk:13726 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Chen, Shawn Xiaoguang, 2017. "The effect of a fiscal squeeze on tax enforcement: Evidence from a natural experiment in China," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 62-76.
    8. Denis Cogneau & Yannick Dupraz & Justine Knebelmann & Sandrine Mesplé-Somps, 2021. "Taxation in Africa from Colonial Times to Present Evidence from former French colonies 1900-2018," Working Papers halshs-03420664, HAL.
    9. Jacob N. Shapiro & Oliver Vanden Eynde, 2023. "Fiscal Incentives for Conflict: Evidence from India's Red Corridor," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 105(1), pages 217-225, January.
    10. Charles Angelucci & Antonio Russo, 2022. "Petty Corruption And Citizen Reports," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(2), pages 831-848, May.
    11. Alessandro Belmonte & Vincenzo Bove & Jessica Di Salvatore, 2021. "Donors for tax morale: Evidence from 34 African countries," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2021-185, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    12. Ruben Enikolopov, 2011. "Are Bureaucrats Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?," Working Papers w0165, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
    13. Dizon-Ross, Rebecca & Dupas, Pascaline & Robinson, Jonathan, 2017. "Governance and the effectiveness of public health subsidies: Evidence from Ghana, Kenya and Uganda," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 150-169.
    14. Blumenstock, Joshua & Callen, Michael & Faikina, Anastasiia & Fiorin, Stefano & Ghani, Tarek, 2023. "Strengthening Fragile States: Evidence from Mobile Salary Payments in Afghanistan," CEPR Discussion Papers 18254, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
    15. Andrew Dustan & Stanislao Maldonado & Juan Manuel Hernandez-Agramonte, 2018. "Motivating bureaucrats with non-monetary incentives when state capacity is weak: Evidence from large-scale field experiments in Peru," Working Papers 136, Peruvian Economic Association.
    16. Isaiah Andrews & Toru Kitagawa & Adam McCloskey, 2024. "Inference on Winners," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 139(1), pages 305-358.
    17. Cappelen, Alexander W. & Fjeldstad, Odd-Helge & Mmari, Donald & Sjursen, Ingrid Hoem & Tungodden, Bertil, 2021. "Understanding the resource curse: A large-scale experiment on corruption in Tanzania," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 129-157.
    18. Manwaring, Priya & Regan, Tanner Weldon Dean, 2023. "Public disclosure and tax compliance: evidence from Uganda," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 121298, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    19. Qun Bao & Rui Huang & Guoqin Pan & Laixun Zhao, 2025. "Inside Job, Chinese Style: Suspicious Use of Public Funds under Fiscal Pressure," Discussion Paper Series DP2025-23, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
    20. Guillermo Cruces & Dario Tortarolo & Gonzalo Vazquez-Bare, 2023. "Design of partial population experiments with an application to spillovers in tax compliance," IFS Working Papers W23/17, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    21. Philipp Barteska & Jay Euijung Lee, 2024. "Bureaucrats and the Korean export miracle," Discussion Papers 2024-11, Nottingham Interdisciplinary Centre for Economic and Political Research (NICEP).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:i4rdps:192. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.i4replication.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.