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Public disclosure and tax compliance: evidence from Uganda

Author

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  • Manwaring, Priya
  • Regan, Tanner Weldon Dean

Abstract

Public disclosure policies have potential to raise tax compliance where alternative enforcement capacity is limited. We study the effects of reporting delinquents and recognizing compliers and provide evidence on the social determinants of tax compliance. Our results are consistent with a model in which being publicly known as tax-eligible is costly but social sanctions for delinquency are limited. Further, disseminating information on tax behavior reduces the compliance of recipients by causing their beliefs to be updated down toward the true compliance rate. Overall, these policies are limited at raising revenue and less effective than simple enforcement reminder nudges.

Suggested Citation

  • Manwaring, Priya & Regan, Tanner Weldon Dean, 2023. "Public disclosure and tax compliance: evidence from Uganda," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 121298, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:121298
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    File URL: https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/121298/
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Reck, Daniel & Slemrod, Joel & Vattø, Trine Engh, 2022. "Public disclosure of tax information: Compliance tool or social network?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
    2. Lucia Del Carpio & Samuel Kapon & Sylvain Chassang, 2022. "Using Divide-and-Conquer to Improve Tax Collection: Evidence from the Field," Working Papers 301, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
    3. Sylvain Chassang & Lucia Del Carpio & Samuel Kapon, 2022. "Using Divide and Conquer to Improve Tax Collection: Theory and Laboratory Evidence," Working Papers 299, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
    4. Makoto Hasegawa & Jefrey L. Hoopes & Ryo Ishida & Joel Slemrod, 2013. "The Effect of Public Disclosure on Reported Taxable Income: Evidence From Individuals and Corporations in Japan," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 66(3), pages 571-608, September.
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    Cited by:

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    JEL classification:

    • O18 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Urban, Rural, Regional, and Transportation Analysis; Housing; Infrastructure
    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

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