Legitimacy in global governance of sovereign default: The role of international investment agreements
This paper analyzes the legitimacy of investor-state arbitration under international investment agreements in sovereign debt restructuring. The paper presents mechanisms governing sovereign default generally, namely collective action clauses and informal negotiation in the London and Paris clubs and then discusses how sovereign debt restructuring is governed by IIAs, looking at how the clauses affect restructuring. Taking the conception of legitimacy in global governance by Buchanan and Keohane as a theoretical framework, the legitimacy of IIAs as a mechanism of governing sovereign debt disputes is questioned, looking at the aspects transparency, accountability, minimal moral acceptability, institutional integrity and comparative benefit. It is concluded that investor-state dispute settlement on the basis of IIAs lacks legitimacy to decide on sovereign debt restructuring.
|Date of creation:||2013|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/polwiss/forschung/oekonomie/ipoe/index.html|
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- Raffer, Kunibert, 1990. "Applying chapter 9 insolvency to international debts: An economically efficient solution with a human face," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-311, February.
- Eric Helleiner, 2008. "The Mystery of the Missing Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism," Contributions to Political Economy, Oxford University Press, vol. 27(1), pages 91-113.
- Freytag, Andreas & Pehnelt, Gernot, 2009. "Debt Relief and Governance Quality in Developing Countries," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 62-80, January.
- van Harten, Gus, 2007. "Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199217892, March.
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