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Deliberative Supranationalism Revisited

  • Christian Joerges; Jurgen Neyer
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    Legal and political science cannot merge, but they should, at the very least, listen to each other. This working paper is a further step in an ongoing interdisciplinary cooperation which seeks to make sense out of Louis Henkin’s famous admonition. This co-operation had begun with a research project on the European comitology system in 1995 and the publication, inter alia, of two articles on deliberative supranationalism in 1997. The present article is an effort to get?/go beyond the scope of our original analyses and to explore the potential of our guiding ideas at a more general level of integration research. In Part I of this paper, Jürgen Neyer summarises strands of normative and positive political theory on which deliberative approaches to international and European governance can build. These approaches not only support coherence, social acceptanceand normative recognition, they also have in important potential for the design of empirical studies. They seem to be particularly promising for the understanding of the institutional design and the political process in the EU. In Part II, Christian Joerges first summarises the objections against deliberative suprantionalism and comitology in legal science. He then presents a conflict-of-law’sapproach to European law which builds upon the 1997 articles and seeks to develop their normative-legal perspectives further. European law is interpreted as a new type of conflict of law which constitutionalises a European unitas in pluralitate. Comitology is interpreted as a cognitive opening of the legal system which institutionalises a second order of conflict of laws

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/6251
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    Paper provided by European University Institute (EUI), Department of Law in its series EUI-LAW Working Papers with number 20.

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    Date of creation: 01 Sep 2006
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    Handle: RePEc:erp:euilaw:p0055
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.eui.eu/LAW/

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    1. Mario Savino, 2005. "The Constitutional Legitimacy of the EU Committees," Les Cahiers européens de Sciences Po 3, Centre d'études européennes (CEE) at Sciences Po, Paris.
    2. Follesdal, Andreas & Hix, Simon, 2005. "Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik," European Governance Papers (EUROGOV) 2, CONNEX and EUROGOV networks.
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