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On the evolutionary edge of migration as an assortative mating device

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  • Stark, Oded
  • Behrens, Doris A.
  • Wang, Yong

Abstract

In a haystack-type representation of a heterogeneous population that is evolving according to a payoff structure of a prisoner's dilemma game, migration is modeled as a process of 'swapping' individuals between heterogeneous groups of constant size after a random allocation fills the haystacks, but prior to mating. Migration is characterized by two parameters: an exogenous participation-in-migration cost (of search, coordination, movement, and arrangement-making) which measures the migration effort, and an exogenous technology - of coordinating and facilitating movement between populated haystacks and the colonization of currently unpopulated haystacks - which measures the migration intensity. Starting from an initially heterogeneous population that consists of both cooperators and defectors a scenario is postulated under which 'programmed' migration can act as a mechanism that brings about a long-run survival of cooperation.

Suggested Citation

  • Stark, Oded & Behrens, Doris A. & Wang, Yong, 2008. "On the evolutionary edge of migration as an assortative mating device," EconStor Preprints 140816, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:esprep:140816
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bergstrom, Theodore C & Stark, Oded, 1993. "How Altruism Can Prevail in an Evolutionary Environment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 149-155, May.
    2. Henrich, Joseph, 2004. "Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 3-35, January.
    3. Ita Falk & Oded Stark, 2001. "Dynasties and Destiny: On the Roles of Altruism and Impatience in the Evolution of Consumption and Bequests," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 68(272), pages 505-518, November.
    4. Stark, Oded, 1999. "Siblings, strangers, and the surge of altruism," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 135-142, November.
    5. Merrill M. Flood, 1958. "Some Experimental Games," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 5(1), pages 5-26, October.
    6. Ben Cooper & Chris Wallace, 2004. "Group selection and the evolution of altruism," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(2), pages 307-330, April.
    7. Stark, Oded, 1998. "On the economics of vanishing," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 261-266, November.
    8. Daniel G. Arce, 2006. "Taking Corporate Culture Seriously: Group Effects in the Trust Game," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 73(1), pages 27-36, July.
    9. Falk, Ita & Stark, Oded, 2001. "Dynasties and Destiny: On the Roles of Altruism and Impatience in the Evolution of Consumption and Bequests," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 68(272), pages 505-518, November.
    10. Theodore C. Bergstrom, 2002. "Evolution of Social Behavior: Individual and Group Selection," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 67-88, Spring.
    11. Theodore C. Bergstrom, 2003. "The Algebra of Assortative Encounters and the Evolution of Cooperation," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 5(03), pages 211-228.
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    Cited by:

    1. Stark, Oded & Jakubek, Marcin, 2011. "Is population growth conducive to the sustainability of cooperation?," Economics & Human Biology, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 443-451.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
    • A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
    • R23 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Household Analysis - - - Regional Migration; Regional Labor Markets; Population

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