An evolutionary explanation for the propensity to migrate
We explore the evolutionary dynamics of a population that consists of cooperators and defectors, wherein each member of the many pairs of players of a one-shot prisoner's dilemma game is drawn at random, and the number of descendents positively depends on the payoffs in the game. We demonstrate how an inclination to migrate may be mapped onto the overall evolutionary fitness of the cooperators. The threshold value of the inclination to migrate parameter is obtained. Intensities of migration higher than that value guarantee that in the long run, the population will consist entirely of cooperators. The threshold value is characterized by the payoff parameters lying at the base of the evolutionary dynamics.
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- Stark, Oded & Wang, You Qiang, 2003.
"On the Evolutionary Edge of Altruism: A Game-Theoretic Proof of Hamilton's Rule for a Simple Case of Siblings,"
139, Institute for Advanced Studies.
- Oded Stark & You Wang, 2004. "On the evolutionary edge of altruism: a game-theoretic proof of Hamilton’s rule for a simple case of siblings," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 37-42, January.
- Falk, Ita & Stark, Oded, 2001.
"Dynasties and Destiny: On the Roles of Altruism and Impatience in the Evolution of Consumption and Bequests,"
London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 68(272), pages 505-18, November.
- Stark, Oded & Falk, Ita, 2000. "Dynasties and Destiny: On the Roles of Altruism and Impatience in the Evolution of Consumption and Bequests," Economics Series 88, Institute for Advanced Studies.
- Stark, Oded & Falk, Ita, 2001. "Dynasties And Destiny: On The Roles Of Altruism And Impatience In The Evolution Of Consumption And Bequests," Discussion Papers 18749, University of Bonn, Center for Development Research (ZEF).
- Bergstrom, Theodore C & Stark, Oded, 1993.
"How Altruism Can Prevail in an Evolutionary Environment,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 149-55, May.
- Theodore C. Bergstrom & Oded Stark, 1994. "How Altruism Can Prevail in an Evolutionary Environment," Microeconomics 9401001, EconWPA.
- Ted Bergstrom & Oded Stark, . "How Altruism Can Prevail in an Evolutionary Environment," Papers _024, University of Michigan, Department of Economics.
- Bergstrom, T.C. & Stark, O., 1993. "How Altruism Can Prevail in an Evolutionary Environment," Papers 93-01, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
- Stark, Oded, 2004.
"Cooperation and wealth,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 109-115, January.
- Stark, Oded, 1999.
"Siblings, strangers, and the surge of altruism,"
Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 135-142, November.
- Stark, Oded, 1998.
"On the economics of vanishing,"
Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 261-266, November.
- Theodore C. Bergstrom, 2002. "Evolution of Social Behavior: Individual and Group Selection," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 67-88, Spring.
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