IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Krankenkassen und Leistungserbringer als Wettbewerbsakteure

Listed author(s):
  • Coenen, Michael
  • Haucap, Justus

Krankenkassen sollen in einer Solidarischen Wettbewerbsordnung als Unternehmen selektivvertragliche Bindungen zum Angebot von Optionstarifen nutzen. Dies sichert ihnen Steuerungsmöglichkeiten und eine echte Mittlerfunktion. Sie sind einer umfassenden Kartellaufsicht und entsprechender Gerichtsbarkeit zu unterstellen. Vertragsgebundene Leistungserbringer sollen von dualen Finanzierungen und Versorgungsplanungen befreit werden. Die Beitragszahler können dann zwischen einem Standardtarif und wettbewerblichen Optionstarifen wählen, in denen Krankenkassen eine Lenkung zu Leistungserbringern vornehmen. In der Notfallversorgung müssen wettbewerbskonforme kollektivvertragliche Lösungen erhalten bleiben.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) in its series DICE Ordnungspolitische Perspektiven with number 54.

in new window

Date of creation: 2014
Handle: RePEc:zbw:diceop:54
Contact details of provider: Postal:
+49 211 81-13820

Phone: +49 211 81-15494
Fax: +49 211 81-15499
Web page:

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

in new window

  1. Annika Herr, 2011. "Quality and Welfare in a Mixed Duopoly with Regulated Prices: The Case of a Public and a Private Hospital," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 12(4), pages 422-437, November.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:diceop:54. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.