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Saubere Umwelt als öffentliches Gut Problem: Evidenz und Implikationen aus Labor- und Feldexperimenten

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  • Anderl, Robin

Abstract

[Gesamtfazit] Als Fazit dieser Arbeit ist festzustellen, dass die eingangs genannten Probleme Trittbrettfahrer, Verschmutzung und Übernutzung nicht vollständig auf die Theorie des Menschen als Homo oeconomicus zurückzuführen sind. Die Experimente konnten unterschiedliche Verhaltensweisen der Probanden aufzeigen. Dabei konnte durchaus Freifahrerverhalten sowie Kooperation beobachtet werden. Die Erkenntnis aus den Experimenten ist, dass die Bereitstellung eines optimalen Levels von dem öffentlichen Gut "saubere Umwelt", bzw. eine nahezu vollständige "saubere Umwelt" ohne aufgesetzten Mechanismus und ohne Staat kaum bzw. nicht zu erreichen ist. Gestaltet sich die Politik auf nationaler Ebene so, dass auf das einzelne Individuum als Problemlöser gesetzt wird, kann das Ergebnis, den Experimenten nach, nur teilweise den gesetzten Zielen entsprechen. Die Erkenntnisse aus Kapitel 4 lassen den Schluss zu, dass die Individuen dem sozialen Dilemma nicht in vollem Maße entkommen. Schlussendlich kommt es darauf an, wie sich die gesellschaftlich erwünschten Ziele darstellen. Jedoch kann die Politik auf Basis der Implikationen aus den Experimenten selbst geeignete Maßnahmen treffen, wie die Schaffung von Möglichkeiten zur Kommunikation, Belohnung und Sanktionierung. Um Übernutzung bzw. Verschmutzung der Umwelt zu vermeiden und von bereits verursachten Schäden zu befreien und somit, in einem nationalen Kontext, zu einer saubereren Umwelt beizutragen.

Suggested Citation

  • Anderl, Robin, 2021. "Saubere Umwelt als öffentliches Gut Problem: Evidenz und Implikationen aus Labor- und Feldexperimenten," The Constitutional Economics Network Working Papers 01-2021, University of Freiburg, Department of Economic Policy and Constitutional Economic Theory.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:cenwps:012021
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Andreoni, James, 1988. "Why free ride? : Strategies and learning in public goods experiments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 291-304, December.
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