IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/cefswp/200902.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The impact of managerial ownership, monitoring and accounting standard choice on accrual mispricing

Author

Listed:
  • Gegenfurtner, Bernhard
  • Ampenberger, Markus
  • Kaserer, Christoph

Abstract

We analyse to what extent the accrual anomaly is related to the choice of the accounting system as well as firm-level heterogeneity in corporate governance mechanisms. Using a unique dataset of listed German firms over the period 1995 to 2005 we first corroborate former results indicating that the accrual anomaly is also present in Germany. However, this anomaly seems to be driven mainly by firms with managerial ownership. In a second step, we test how different corporate governance mechanisms affect the anomaly. For the German experiment on voluntary adoption of IFRS our results confirm previous findings that the anomaly is less likely to be present under a conservative accounting system. While creditor monitoring is able to reduce the accrual anomaly, shareholder monitoring is not. Apart from offering evidence related to the cross-sectional difference in the degree of accrual mispricing, our results give also some insights related to the cross-country variation of this phenomenon.

Suggested Citation

  • Gegenfurtner, Bernhard & Ampenberger, Markus & Kaserer, Christoph, 2009. "The impact of managerial ownership, monitoring and accounting standard choice on accrual mispricing," CEFS Working Paper Series 2009-02, Technische Universität München (TUM), Center for Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies (CEFS).
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:cefswp:200902
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/48411/1/603353495.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Wenger, E & Kaserer, C, 1997. "The German System of Corporate Governance - A Model Which Should Not Be Imitated," Papers 14, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies-.
    2. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December.
    3. Jacob, John & Jorgensen, Bjorn N., 2007. "Earnings management and accounting income aggregation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(2-3), pages 369-390, July.
    4. repec:bla:joares:v:29:y:1991:i:2:p:193-228 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. repec:hrv:faseco:30747162 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 2000. "Investor protection and corporate governance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 3-27.
    7. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 461-488, June.
    8. Christoph Kaserer & Carmen Klingler, 2008. "The Accrual Anomaly Under Different Accounting Standards - Lessons Learned from the German Experiment," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(7-8), pages 837-859.
    9. Leuz, Christian & Nanda, Dhananjay & Wysocki, Peter D., 2003. "Earnings management and investor protection: an international comparison," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 505-527, September.
    10. Arthur Kraft & Andrew J. Leone & Charles E. Wasley, 2007. "Regression-Based Tests of the Market Pricing of Accounting Numbers: The Mishkin Test and Ordinary Least Squares," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(5), pages 1081-1114, December.
    11. Holger Daske & Luzi Hail & Christian Leuz & Rodrigo Verdi, 2008. "Mandatory IFRS Reporting around the World: Early Evidence on the Economic Consequences," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(5), pages 1085-1142, December.
    12. Gorm Gabrielsen & Jeffrey D. Gramlich & Thomas Plenborg, 2002. "Managerial Ownership, Information Content of Earnings, and Discretionary Accruals in a Non-US Setting," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(7&8), pages 967-988.
    13. Warfield, Terry D. & Wild, John J. & Wild, Kenneth L., 1995. "Managerial ownership, accounting choices, and informativeness of earnings," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 61-91, July.
    14. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1980. "Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 42-64, Spring.
    15. Brenda van Tendeloo & Ann Vanstraelen, 2005. "Earnings management under German GAAP versus IFRS," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(1), pages 155-180.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Rapp, Marc Steffen, 2010. "Information asymmetries and the value-relevance of cash flow and accounting figures: empirical analysis and implications for managerial accounting," CEFS Working Paper Series 2010-08, Technische Universität München (TUM), Center for Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies (CEFS).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Accrual Anomaly; Earnings Quality; Corporate Governance; Managerial Ownership; Capital Market Efficiency; Accounting Standard; Shareholder Monitoring; Creditor Monitoring;

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • M4 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:cefswp:200902. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/fwtumde.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.