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Neuer Paternalismus und individuelle Rationalität: eine ordnungsökonomische Perspektive

Listed author(s):
  • Schnellenbach, Jan

In den letzten Jahren hat sich ein breiter Literaturstrang etabliert, der neue Formen paternalistischer Interventionen vorschlägt, um individuelle Entscheidungen zu verbessern, die nicht vollständig rational sind. Die Motivation hierfür liegt in zahlreichen Verhaltensanomalien und anderen Abweichungen vom Modell vollständiger Rationalität, die von der empirischen Verhaltensökonomik identifiziert wurden. Der neue Paternalismus zeichnet sich nach seinen Befürwortern dadurch aus, dass er 'libertär' ist, da die betroffenen Individuen in die als effizient erachtete Richtung geschubst, aber nicht gezwungen werden. Die Möglichkeit zu abweichendem Verhalten soll grundsätzlich erhalten bleiben. In diesem Papier wird der neue Paternalismus aus einer ordnungsökonomischen Perspektive untersucht. Es wird gezeigt, dass wichtige Varianten des neuen Paternalismus mit den ordnungsökonomischen Steuerungsidealen der Konsumentensouveränität und der Bürgersouveränität kollidieren.

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Paper provided by Walter Eucken Institut e.V. in its series Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics with number 14/08.

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Date of creation: 2014
Handle: RePEc:zbw:aluord:1408
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  1. Goldschmidt, Nils, 2005. "Ist Gier gut? Ökonomisches Selbstinteresse zwischen Maßlosigkeit und Bescheidenheit," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 05/10, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
  2. Vanberg, Viktor J., 2005. "Das Paradoxon der Marktwirtschaft: Die Verfassung des Marktes und das Problem der "sozialen Sicherheit"," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 05/5, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
  3. Viktor Vanberg, 2007. "Corporate social responsibility and the ‘game of catallaxy’: the perspective of constitutional economics," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 199-222, September.
  4. Vanberg, Viktor J., 2005. "Auch Staaten tut Wettbewerb gut: Eine Replik auf Paul Kirchhof," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 05/2, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
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