High Water Marks
Incentive fees for money managers are frequently accompanied by high water mark provisions which condition the payment of the incentive upon exceeding the maximum achieved share value. In this paper, we show that these high water mark contracts are valuable to money managers, and conversely represent a claim on a significant proportion of investor wealth. We provide a closed-form solution to the high water mark contract under certain conditions. This solution shows that managers have an incentive to take risks. We conjecture that the existence of high water mark compensation is due to decreasing returns to scale in the industry. Empirical evidence on the relationship between fund return and net money flows into and out of funds suggests that successful managers, and large fund managers are less willing to take new money than small fund managers.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Chevalier, J. & Ellison, G., 1996.
"Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives,"
96-3, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Chevalier, Judith & Ellison, Glenn, 1997. "Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(6), pages 1167-1200, December.
- Judith A. Chevalier & Glenn D. Ellison, 1995. "Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives," NBER Working Papers 5234, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Goetzmann, William N & Peles, Nadav, 1997.
"Cognitive Dissonance and Mutual Fund Investors,"
Journal of Financial Research,
Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 20(2), pages 145-58, Summer.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ysm:somwrk:ysm22. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.