What Drives Differences in Health Care Demand? The Role of Health Insurance and Selection Bias
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References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Calub, Renz Adrian, 2014. "Physician quality and payment schemes: A theoretical and empirical analysis," MPRA Paper 66038, University Library of Munich, Germany.
More about this item
KeywordsHealth care; Health insurance; Adverse selection; Treatment e ects model; Medical subsidy program;
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- C31 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models; Quantile Regressions; Social Interaction Models
- H51 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Health
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-06-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-HEA-2012-06-25 (Health Economics)
- NEP-IAS-2012-06-25 (Insurance Economics)
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