Distributive Implications for Governing Party Constituencies: Evidence from Bangladesh

We investigate distributive implications for governing party constituencies in Bangladesh, a young democracy where programmatic government transfers are yet to be established. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find that having a member of parliament (MP) in the governing parties leads to greater household consumption and lower poverty. We find some evidence that governing party constituencies have better access to publicly provided goods and services, such as access to electricity. However, the quantile treatment effects (QTEs) of having a government MP are notably more pronounced at the high end of consumption distribution compared to the low end. Furthermore, the largest landowners, in terms of acreage, derive the greatest benefits. Interestingly, we find no evidence suggesting that the unequal QTEs stem from a structural transformation in the local economy facilitated by enhanced infrastructure. Our findings suggest that although poor households obtain some benefits from having a government MP, wealthy households disproportionately profit from the advantages brought about by their presence.