Is it Redistribution or Centralization? On the Determinants of Government Investment in Infrastructure
The dilemma efficiency versus equity, together with political partisan interests, has received increasing attention to explain the territorial allocation of investments. However, centralization intended to introduce or reinforce hierarchization in the political system has not been object as of now of empirical analysis. Our main contribution to the literature is providing evidence that meta-political objectives related to the ordering of political power and administration influence regional investment. In this way, we find evidence that network mode’s (roads and railways) investment programs are influenced by the centralization strategy of investing near to the political capital, while investment effort in no-network modes (airports and ports) appears to be positively related to distance. Since investment in surface transportation infrastructures is much higher than that in airports and ports, and taken into account that regions surrounding the political capital are poorer than the average, we suggest that centralization rather than redistribution has been the driver for the concentration of public investment on these regions.
|Date of creation:||Dec 2010|
|Date of revision:||Dec 2010|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Fundació Bosch i Gimpera, C. Baldiri i Reixac, 4-8, 08028 Barcelona|
Web page: http://www.xreap.cat
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Knight, Brian, 2004.
"Parochial interests and the centralized provision of local public goods: evidence from congressional voting on transportation projects,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 845-866, March.
- Brian Knight, 2003. "Parochial Interests and the Centralized Provision of Local Public Goods: Evidence from Congressional Voting on Transportation Projects," NBER Working Papers 9748, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kemmerling, Achim & Stephan, Andreas, 2002.
"The Contribution of Local Public Infrastructure to Private Productivity and Its Political Economy: Evidence from a Panel of Large German Cities,"
Springer, vol. 113(3-4), pages 403-24, December.
- Achim Kemmerling & Andreas Stephan, 2001. "The Contribution of Local Public Infrastructure to Private Productivity and Its Political-Economy: Evidence from a Panel of Large German Cities," CIG Working Papers FS IV 01-14, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
- de la Fuente, Angel, 2004. "Second-best redistribution through public investment: a characterization, an empirical test and an application to the case of Spain," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(5), pages 489-503, September.
- Jean-Paul Faguet, 2004. "Why So Much Centralization? A Model of Primitive Centripetal Accumulation," STICERD - Development Economics Papers - From 2008 this series has been superseded by Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers 43, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Norihiko Yamano & Toru Ohkawara, 2000. "The Regional Allocation of Public Investment: Efficiency or Equity?," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(2), pages 205-229.
- Achim Kemmerling & Andreas Stephan, 2010. "The Determinants of Regional Transport Investment Across Europe," Chapters, in: The Political Economy of Inter-Regional Fiscal Flows, chapter 11 Edward Elgar Publishing.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:xrp:wpaper:xreap2010-15. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (XREAP)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.