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Reputation Effects in Gold Glove Award Voting

Author

Listed:
  • Arthur Zillante

    (ICES, George Mason University)

Abstract

Reputation effects have been thought to influence how candidates in an election are viewed by the electorate. Using data from Major League Baseball, I attempt to quantify the effect that reputation plays in voting for the Gold Glove award. While the award is designed to reflect current-year defensive accomplishments, two other hypotheses have been suggested to explain voting behavior. The first is that voters use current-year offensive accomplishments in lieu of defensive accomplishments. The second hypothesis is that voters rely on the past performance of the players when casting their ballots, implying that reputation effects exist in the minds of voters. Results from probit estimation show that while reputation effects appear to have a significant effect on the outcome of the election, current-year offensive accomplishments do not.

Suggested Citation

  • Arthur Zillante, 2005. "Reputation Effects in Gold Glove Award Voting," Public Economics 0502003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0502003
    Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 13
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    File URL: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/pe/papers/0502/0502003.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Daniel S. Hamermesh & Peter Schmidt, 2003. "The Determinants of Econometric Society Fellows Elections," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(1), pages 399-407, January.
    2. Victor Ginsburgh, 2003. "Awards, Success and Aesthetic Quality in the Arts," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(2), pages 99-111, Spring.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Voting behavior; baseball;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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