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New Anti-Merger Theories: A Critique

  • Edward J. Lopez

    (San Jose State University)

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate two new anti-merger instruments, innovation markets and unilateral effects, on the basis of economic theory and evidence. I first discuss how the economics of antitrust has developed over the years, with the intention of characterizing the intellectual inheritance of 1990s’ antitrust regulators. Within this context, I then discuss each anti-merger instrument, how it has been applied in specific cases, and how it accords with underlying economic science. On the basis of these arguments, antitrust regulators should pause and reconsider the theoretical and empirical bases of applying unilateral effects and innovation markets to merger investigations.

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File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/le/papers/0512/0512003.pdf
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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Law and Economics with number 0512003.

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Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 12 Dec 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwple:0512003
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 20. This paper was published in Cato Journal, Winter 2001. Stable URL:
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://128.118.178.162

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  1. Faith, Roger L & Leavens, Donald R & Tollison, Robert D, 1982. "Antitrust Pork Barrel," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(2), pages 329-42, October.
  2. Robert D. Tollison, 1985. "Public Choice and Antitrust," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 4(3), pages 905-931, Winter.
  3. Jorde, Thomas M & Teece, David J, 1990. "Innovation and Cooperation: Implications for Competition and Antitrust," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 4(3), pages 75-96, Summer.
  4. Spence, Michael, 1983. "Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure: A Review Article," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 21(3), pages 981-90, September.
  5. George J. Stigler, 1983. "The Origin of the Sherman Act," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 27, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
  6. Salop, Steven C & Scheffman, David T, 1983. "Raising Rivals' Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(2), pages 267-71, May.
  7. Brock, William A, 1983. "Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure: A Review Article," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(6), pages 1055-66, December.
  8. Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, 1994. "Systems Competition and Network Effects," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(2), pages 93-115, Spring.
  9. Baumol, William J, 1982. "Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(1), pages 1-15, March.
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