Open Source vs Closed Source Software: Public Policies in the Software Market
This paper analyses the impact of public policies supporting open source software (OSS). Users can be divided between those who know about the existence of OSS, the "informed" adopters, and the "uninformed" ones; the presence of uniformed users yields to market failures that justify government intervention. We study three policies: i) mandatory adoption, when government forces public agencies, schools and universities to adopt OSS, ii) information campaign, when the government informs the uninformed users about the existence and the characteristics of OSS and, iii) subsidisation, when consumers are payed a subsidy when adopting OSS. We show that the second policy enhances welfare, the third is always welfare decreasing while mandatory adoption can be either good or bad for society depending on the number of informed and uninformed adopters. We extend the model to the presence of network effects and we show that strong externalities require "drastic" policies.
|Date of creation:||16 Jun 2003|
|Date of revision:|
|Note:||Type of Document - pdf; prepared on Latex; to print on PostScript; pages: 33; figures: included|
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Erik Brynjolfsson & Chris F. Kemerer, 1996.
"Network Externalities in Microcomputer Software: An Econometric Analysis of the Spreadsheet Market,"
INFORMS, vol. 42(12), pages 1627-1647, December.
- Erik Brynjolfsson & Chris F. Kemerer, 1993. "Network Externalities in Microcomputer Software: An Econometric Analysis of the Spreadsheet Market," Working Paper Series 158, MIT Center for Coordination Science.
- Schmidt, Klaus M. & Schnitzer, Monika, 2003. "Public Subsidies for Open Source? Some Economic Policy Issues of the Software Market," CEPR Discussion Papers 3793, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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